HOW WARS END

WAR TERMINATION IN AFRICAN AND ASIAN COLONIAL WARFARE

BY

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To My Parents

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed .....(candidate)
Date 13th April, 1999

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations,except where otherwise stated.Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references.A bibliography is appended.

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STATEMENT 2

I hereby give consent for my thesis,if accepted,to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan,and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

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Summary

This thesis tests war termination theories against the historical reality of four colonial wars fought in Africa and Asia by European powers in the period 1946 to 1974.

'Victory' was examined by looking at the ideas of O'Connor and Carroll.To win a colonial war the imperial power must promise to,and be seen to be taking steps towards granting eventual independence.Otherwise,the colonial power will not win the hearts and minds of the population.

'Termination points' were analysed by applying the ideas of Coser,Galtung,Kecskemeti,Klingberg and Voevodsky to colonial warfare.It was found that the termination point which tipped the balance was the realisation after a succession of battle defeats that war was unwinnable.

Azar's idea that de-escalation occurred because of military setbacks or public opinion pressures was only evident in Portugal's war in Mozambique.In Malaya,de-escalation occurred after British military success.In Algeria and Indochina a large military presence was needed to stabilise the military situation and maintain civic order right up to war's end.

Regarding factors delaying war termination,it was found that France and Portugal's paternalistic approach to colonial management,combined with economic necessity and the fear of Communism all helped to delay the ending of war.

Randle's view that political reorientation heralded

the ending of a war seems to be supported by events. So too does Halperin and Rothstein's idea of regime change and war termination.

Tactics to secure peace agreements will only be effective if one of the belligerents wants war termination regardless of political costs.Ideological hatred and unrealised war ambitions undermine peace and can lead to further bloodshed.

A framework combining observable behaviour such as battle defeats and military and political indicators of a war's imminent end has been devised to help policy-makers decide when to terminate a war.

Introduction

The crude logic of this thesis is as follows.War termination theorists have postulated a number of theories about the ending of wars.These ideas need to be formulated in the form of testable hypotheses and tested against the reality of a number of case studies in order to see whether or not the propositions stand or need modification.

In one respect the position of 'War Termination' in the field of Strategic Studies is similar to that of the fairy tale character of Cinderella.Both War Termination and Cinderella have suffered from relative neglect.Prior to 1970 only a few books and articles were written on War Termination.However,in 1970 the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted its entire November issue to the important subject of how wars end. The interest taken by a concerned body of scholars was probably influenced by the Vietnam War,because in 1970,American officials were trying to extricate themselves from a long and bloody war in Vietnam.

After 1970,War Termination as an academic subject divided into two main areas of interest.The first concentrated on the problems associated with the peace-making process.In 1974 Robert Randle published The Origins of Peace and in 1983 Paul Pillar published his book on bargaining entitled,Negotiating Peace.The second area was Nuclear War Termination, with studies examining the ways and means of terminating nuclear war on favourable political terms.Nuclear war termination raises issues far removed from the termination of colonial wars,and for this

reason will not be examined in this thesis.

The major gap in the literature on war termination is the lack of rigorous testing of theory against historical reality although Leon Sigal's book,Fighting to the Finish tested war termination theory against the reality,of the Japanese surrender in World War Two.His conclusions will be examined in Chapter One.

The aim of this thesis is to test war termination theories against the historical reality of four case studies-the Malayan Emergency,the French wars in Algeria and Indo-China and the Portuguese war in Mozambique.These are colonial wars fought by European powers from 1946 to 1974 and provide good opportunities to study the different aspects of war termination theory.

If war termination theory is to stand up it must predict when a war will end,and explain why one of the belligerents ended up as the winner whilst the other ended up a loser.There was a clear cut winner in three of the cases examined in this thesis.The Malayan emergency ended in 1960 with the British being the eventual winners.The Algerian war ended in 1962 with the FLN attaining their core aim of independence.Finally,the war in Mozambique ended in 1974 with Frelimo emerging as the victors.We need to test whether or not war termination theories explain these outcomes.

War termination theory must also explain why some wars do not end with outright victory and why some peace settlements do not last very long.This is why the French-

Indo-Chinese war has been included in this analysis.There was no clear cut winner in 1954 and peace did not last very in that country.We need to find out if there is a correlation between partial victory and the length of peace settlements.Malaya has been included because the British experience seems to have influenced the manner in which France and Portugal fought their colonial wars.Moreover, Malaya provides an opportunity to consider what factors result in victory for the colonial power.

This thesis will address four basic questions: a)Do the war termination theories stand or fall when applied to historical reality? b)Do the war termination theories need modification? c)Are there any other factors,not identified by war termination theorists,which nevertheless are important in the war termination process? d)What lessons can policy makers draw from this thesis? Ideally the answers to these questions will lead to a better understanding of how wars end.From the perspective of the policy maker,our findings may help officials terminate wars,avoid further bloodshed and build durable peace settlements.

The analysis will be carried out in the following manner.Chapter One will review the war termination literature.Broadly speaking,war termination theories fall into three areas:military aspects;the domestic-political dimension;and the problems of peace-making.The literature review will break down the theories into a number of propositions which will be tested in the main body of the

thesis.Chapter Two is a comparative study of Revolutionary and Counter-insurgency warfare,and is written on the assumption that the reader has no prior knowledge of colonial warfare.

Chapter Three through Nine will test the war termination propositions.Each of these chapters has the same format:a)Proposition. b)Application of proposition to Malaya,Indo-China,Algeria and Mozambique. c)Does the proposition stand or fall when tested against the case study? This structure allows theory to be tested in a logical and systematic manner.

The conclusion will summarise findings,suggest modifications,and outline other reasons why wars end.This chapter will also discuss policy implications resulting from this study.The final chapter will suggest avenues for further research.

War,as someone once said,is hell on earth.This thesis is written in the belief that the weight of the dead,the anguish of the bereaved and the suffering of the maimed make it imperative to develop ways to ,'halt the witless engine of war from continuing with the destruction.'[1]

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[1] Herman Kahn,'Issues of Thermonuclear War Termination,' Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,November,1970,p.137.

Chapter One

War Termination in Conventional Warfare

War termination theorists have identified the following themes:factors causing victory or defeat; termination points; de-escalation; domestic aspects of war termination; and the peace-making process.We will now outline and discuss these.

'Victory'

Berenice Carroll and Raymond G.O'Connor were interested in working out a definition of the word, 'Victory,' and also sought to explain how this state of affairs occurs.Each adopted very different approaches. O'Connor tried to find an all embracing definition,whilst Carroll analysed the four senses or dimensions in which the term,'Victory' could be used.

According to O'Connor,'Victory' means the following: 'the cessation of armed conflict under conditions satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms of stated objectives.'[2]

His definition is a broad one,and allows the following outcomes to be classified as victory-the attainment of independence,the capture of a capital city,the partial attainment of aims,unconditional surrender and the pacification of a country.[3]

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[2] Raymond G O'Connor,'Victory in Modern War',Journal of Peace Research,Vol.4.(1969),p.368.

[3] ibid,pp.368-372.

Adopting a different approach,Berenice Carroll argued that,'Victory' can be used in four ways,depending on the type of war being fought and what aims are achieved.Her four dimensions are the following:the annihil- ation of an opponents military and industrial centres;the relationship between aims and outcomes;gain versus loss calculations between warring states;and the creation of the relationship between victor and vanquished.[4]

Thus Victory is the state of affairs which occurs when a belligerent has gained superiority or supremacy over an opponent.O'Connor examined how this situation arose,and noted that the reasons for victory vary from war to war.For example,stability of the rear is necessary to achieve victory in a civil war,whilst in a war of liberation the support of the population is vital.Controlling one's forces is a vital ingredient of victory in a limited war.[5]

These are primary or essential conditions for victory but later on we will see that there are numerous additonal or secondary causes of victory.For example,in the Gulf War, allied control of the air was a primary reason for the defeat of Saddam's forces in Kuwait.Control of the air allowed a successful ground assault by UN forces whose weight of numbers and technological superiority drove the Iraqis from Kuwait.

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[4] B.A.Carroll,'How Wars End:An Analysis of some Current Hypotheses',in Journal of Peace Research,Vol.4,(1969), pp.305-306.

[5] O'Connor,p.377.

Termination Points

A Termination Point is an indicator or a sign that a war is about to end.Theorists examining termination points can be loosely divided into two groups and this division is based on the methodology used.The first group includes Lewis Coser,Johan Galtung and Paul Kecskemeti.The second group of theorists identify termination points and attempt to mathematically predict when they will occur in a war.Frank Klingberg,John Voevodsky and Berenice Carroll fall into this second group.The ultimate aim of quantitative analyses of war termination is to predict the outcome of a war before it has started in order to provide decision makers with, 'Perfect Foresight.'[6]

Lewis Coser identified the existence of 'symbolic signposts'which indicate the imminent ending of a war.Among his 'signposts' are the capture of a fortress or a capital city.Other examples include the capture of items of great symbolic importance such as military commanders or strategic assets such as oil fields.[7] Johan Galtung concurs.He accepted the existence of 'symbolic signposts' and further identified the presence of another termination point,which he called 'qualitative shifts,' on the battlefield.He wrote:

'Points of termination of conflicts are located where there is a transition from change in quantity,to change in

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[6] Carroll,'How Wars End:An Analysis of some Current Hypotheses,'p.304.

[7] Lewis Coser,'The Termination of Conflict',Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.4,1961,p.350.

quality [such as the loss of the capital]...there is a qualitative jump because of the symbolic importance of the capital even if major administrative functions have been transferred elsewhere.'[8]

Paul Kecskemeti has suggested that a war will end when its outcome is 'irreversible.' He believed that if one side has sufficient reserves to reverse a dire situation it can always escalate the conflict until it gains an advantage. 'Irreversibility' only occurs when all means to achieve victory have been exhausted.When this happens,a belligerent has the option of negotiation or surrender.[9] Kecskemeti's concept necessarily involves military and political perceptions about a war's outcome.

The American experience in Vietnam from 1964 to 1969 neatly illustrates Kecskemeti's theory.President Johnson's military build up in Vietnam was an attempt to reverse a military stalemate.The Americans hoped that military escaltion would inflict a decisive defeat on the Vietcong and their North Vietnamese allies.They were wrong.After the Tet Offensive in 1968 American leaders concluded-probably incorrectly-that victory was unattainable.Vietnam became an issue in the American presidential elections in 1968,with Richard Nixon being returned with a pledge to disengage from the war.

Yet there have been cases when states have had the

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[8] Johan Galtung,'Institutionalised Conflict Reduction,' Journal of Peace Research,Vol.2,(1965),pp.373-374.

[9] Paul Kecskemeti,'Political Rationality in Ending Wars' in Annals,Nov 1970,pp.107-109.

means to reverse an outcome but refrained from actually doing so.Take,for example,the war in Bosnia in the mid 1990s,when NATO states looked over the precipice of intervention and chose not to jump.In 1995 the NATO powers clearly had the military means to reverse the desperate situation of the Bosnian Muslims.They chose not to because of the risks involved with escalation.Bitter memories of past wars seem to have influenced the USA and its NATO allies.Mindful of their Vietnam defeat,American leaders were reluctant to involve themselves in another civil war.Remembering that a similar Bosnian crisis ignited World War One,European states,and in particular Britain,refused to aid the Bosnian Muslims.It was not the prospect of losing that worried Europeans the most.Rather it was the risk of the war spreading to the wider Balkan region that influenced their decision not to intervene.

Does this mean that Kecskemeti is wrong? Far from it.In the light of the Bosnian experience,Kecskemeti's principle needs to be slightly modified.Clearly,wars end when the outcome is irreversible,and this occurs when escalation has failed to achieve victory.However,the outcome is also irreversible if states refrain from escalation for fear of widening a war.

Frank Klingberg identified four variables that could influence policy makers in their decision to terminate a war.These are:army size ratios;casualty ratios; intensity of fighting and proportion of battle defeats.According to him,if any two variables are unfavourable for two campaign

periods then an ending is in sight.[10] He wrote:

'...most wars end within a fairly short time after certain significant shifts in trends occur.Such shifts often appear immediately after a final great effort has ended in failure, like the great German drive in the spring of 1918.'[11]

Klingberg's theory does not seem to apply to revolutionary warfare movements whose leaders are content simply not to lose the war.For instance,during the Franco-Algerian war the FLN lost the battle of Algiers in 1957 and suffered heavy losses at the time of the Challe plan in 1959.Yet the FLN leaders did not surrender but continued the war up to 1962.

John Voevodsky tried to find the maximum pain threshold that a nation will tolerate before it terminated a war.Basing his analysis on American involvement in five wars,Voevodsky rightly concluded that there is a clear limit in casualties that a nation will tolerate.[12] When the pain is insufferable a state either accepts defeat,changes its leadership,or acquires new allies.[13] This analysis has two weaknesses.First,he assumes that other states will act

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[10] Frank L.Klingberg,'Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses,'in Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.10,No.2,(1966),p.149.

[11] ibid,p.167.

[12] John Voevodsky,'Quantitative Behaviour of Warring Nations',Journal of Psychology,Vol.72,May 1969.

[13] ibid,pp.270-279.

in the same manner as American leaders.[14] Second,his analysis ignores ideological and pyschological factors which may exert a stronger influence on behaviour,particularly for revolutionary warfare movements.For example,in the Vietnam War the North Vietnamese suffered heavy losses from American bombing campaigns but despite this refused to capitulate.

Berenice Carroll listed nine variables that she believed influenced war termination.These are:the aims of the belligerents; the situation at the time; morale;costs;vulnerability; potential reserves;domestic conditions;external factors;and peace terms.[15] Later on we will see that Carroll has correctly identified most of the factors affecting when and how a war will end.

This thesis will not adopt the mathematical approach favoured by Carroll,Klingberg and Voevodsky partly because the author lacks the mathematical background,and partly because he is sceptical of the mathematical approach to the study of war and international politics.His scepticism is based on the view that the assignment of value to each variable is a subjective process.Moreover it is also clear that the value of each variable will fluctuate rather than remain constant.

De-Escalation

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[14] Berenice Carroll,'War Termination and Conflict Theory,' Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,Nov 1970,pp.20-21.

[15] Carroll,'How Wars End....',pp.314-315.

The word,'De-escalation' means the winding down of military hostilities or reducing the level of violence.De-escalation is the result of political decisions to wind down a war,and usually occurs after heavy battlefield losses or the non-attainment of aims.Edward Azar and Robert Randle are the two theorists whose ideas on de-escalation will be examined in this thesis.Azar was principally concerned with finding out why de-escalation occured,whereas Randle looked at the symptoms of de-escalation.

After analysing the 1956 Suez Crisis,Azar observed a dramatic shift in British and French aims.In less than two weeks these two states changed their original aim of reversing the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal to a reluctant acceptance of this new state of affairs.[16] Azar concluded that:

'..as costs..increase,as preferences are modulated or re-ranked,and as public opinion in favour of de-escalation increases,nation states who are in the midst of a crisis are likely to move towards the temporary reduction of hostile interactions by moving back to their pre-crisis relations range.'[17]

Clearly,the Suez Crisis provides a useful example of de-escalation,but two points need to be made.De-escalation by the British and French was largely brought about by

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[16] Eward E.Azar,'Conflict Escalation and Reduction in Suez,1956',in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.12,No.2,(1972),pp.197-8.

[17] ibid,p.199.

American pressure on Britain,rather than non-attainment of military aims.Therefore,in some situations states or international organisations such as the UN,which are indirectly involved in a war,can bring about a de-escalation of hostilities.This might be achieved by economic pressure,such as trade embargoes,the cessation of military support to one of the belligerents,or policing ceasefires.

Second,Suez was more of a crisis than a war.Management of a crisis is different from terminating a war because wars and crises differ.A crisis is defined as a,'momentous juncture in war,politics,commerce or domestic politics.'[18] War on the other hand is a,'contest carried on by force of arms between nations or between parties of the same state;a state of hostilities with suspension of ordinary international relations...'[19] Thus,crisis is a much broader term than war.This is not to say that nothing can be learnt from the termination of crises but one needs to be careful about drawing lessons from one situation and applying them to another which is conceptually different.

Robert Randle looked for signs indicating the beginning of the de-escalation process.Symptoms of de-escalation,he believed,were military withdrawal from certain areas;a reduction in bomb attacks;a shift to more

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[18] The Cassell Concise English Dictionary,(Cassell Publishers Limited,London,1989),p.308.

[19] ibid,p.1480.

discriminate attacks against the enemy.[20] Randle implies that a state can control de-escalation by choosing what to attack.This,of course,assumes that the opponent will be able to read the de-escalation signals properly,although in the fog of war this might be difficult.

Domestic Aspects of War Termination.

The problems associated with the domestic aspects of war termination have been analysed by Morton Halperin, Robert Rothstein,Paul Kecskemeti,Leon Sigal,Robert Randle,George Quester,Michael Handel,Fred Iklé and Lewis Richardson.The main issues in domestic war termination theory relate to the factors delaying war termination and 'reorientation.'

Broadly speaking,writers have offered four explanations as to why war termination is sometimes delayed.The first group,comprising Halperin,Rothstein and Sigal,looked at the way government bureaucracy can delay the termination of war.The second group,typified by Handel offer a'Rational choice 'model to show how wars end.A third type of study,used for example by Richardson,dealt with the impact of public opinion on the ending of war.The fourth explanation, adopted by Iklé,saw war termination as a struggle between 'hawks and doves.'The common thread which runs through all these studies is the conflict between the

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[20] Robert Randle,The Origins of Peace:A Study of Peace-Making and the Structure of Peace Settlements,(New York:Free Press,1973),p.476.

various interest groups within society on the issue of war termination.

Morton Halperin,Robert Rothstein and Leon Sigal have examined how bureaucratic politics can delay the ending of wars.Halperin's argument runs as follows.Government is composed of several diverse interest groups ranging from legislatures, executive bodies,the military establishment and foreign offices.Securing agreement between these groups on the issue of war termination is difficult,usually because each group has its own policy agenda,its own aims to achieve and budgets to maintain.[21] Rothstein agreed with Halperin's analysis and concluded that a bureaucracy steeped in compromise could delay war termination because it could not act decisively enough.[22]

Thinking along similar lines to Halperin and Rothstein,Leon Sigal argued that a government bureaucracy suffered from a kind of 'structural indecision' which was built into the system.Compromise politics was not the problem-it was merely a symptom of a wider malaise caused by the fact that the individual components of a government followed their own agendas,priorities and routines,with the result that a government was constantly tugged in different directions.In this environment war termination was

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[21] Morton Halperin,'War Termination and Civil-Military Relations,'Annals,Nov 1970,pp.86-93.

[22] Robert Rothstein,'Domestic Politics of Peacemaking,' Annals,Nov 1970,pp.65-66.

inevitably delayed.[23] Testing this theory against historical reality,Sigal concluded that organisational politics provided the clearest explanation for the delay in the Japanese decision to surrender at the end of the Second World War.For Sigal,the great tragedy of the,'Pacific Endgame' was the unnecessary use of the atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.He has cited abundant evidence to back up his claim that Japan was on the brink of surrender in August 1945 because its navy had been destroyed and it had lost control of the air.[24]

The bureauctic approach as a way of thinking about war termination has one major weakness.It ignores the impact of strong,charismatic leaders on government policy making.For example,it is particularly ironic that Sigal's explanation for the Japanese surrender in the Pacific does not adequately explain the Nazi surrender in Europe in May 1945.Germany did not surrender until eleven months after the D Day landings of June 1944.During this period the Nazis lost control of France,Holland,Belgium,Norway, Russian territories and Poland.Despite these losses Hitler refused to stop fighting.So strong was Hitler's refusal to capitulate that he chose suicide rather than surrender, leaving his successor,Admiral Doenitz,the humiliating task of opening peace talks with the Allied powers.Clearly,the bureaucratic model as an explanation for delay in the

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[23] Leon Sigal,Fighting to a Finish,(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1988),pp.19-25.

[24] ibid,pp.283-286.

ending of war,makes no allowances for the Hitlers of this world.

Both Paul Kecskemeti and Michael Handel adopted what Leon Sigal termed a 'Rational Choice Model' to explain why war termination is delayed.Sigal believed that politicians act rationally and calculate potential gains against potential losses.Following this line of thought Michael Handel,for example,listed several factors that could postpone war termination.These included:the view that bargaining could weaken the political and military position;the fear of a harsh peace;the feeling that 'time is on our side';the desire to secure a better peace.[25] Paradoxically,these choices are rational ones.After all it is clearly beneficial for a state to obtain the best possible deal,even if it does mean continued bloodshed.A good illustration of Handel's point is Richard Nixon's policy towards Vietnam.Nixon realised that the Vietnamese war was unwinnable,yet at the same time he also knew that if America withdrew,then the South Vietnamese regime would be at the mercy of the National Liberation Front and its allies in North Vietnam.Thus America gradually withdrew its forces and trained Southern Vietnamese forces,in a policy known as 'Vietnamisation.' Nixon's rational choice therefore delayed war termination in Vietnam.

Another factor which delays the decision to end a war is the 'political mood' of a country.This idea dominates

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[25] Michael Handel,'The study of War Termination,'Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol.1,(1),May 1978,pp.70-71.

two articles written by Lewis Richardson in the late 1940s.Richardson studied the impact of public opinion during the First World War.[26] He suggested that war termination will not occur unless war weariness has gripped the population.Anyone who tries to terminate a war before war weariness has occurred will usually fail.Lenin and Stalin,from 1914 to 1917,tried in vain to turn the Russian proletariat against the war,but failed because war weariness was not widespread enough to have any effect on morale.[27]

Iklé has suggested another reason why war termination can be delayed.He compared the struggle to end a war with a battle between 'hawks' and 'doves' in society.Until this domestic political conflict is resolved,the war will continue.He noted that a government may be split over objectives,with some leaders believing that the war's outcome must justify previous sacrifices.[28]

These,it is argued, are the main reasons why delays occur in war termination but there have been instances where other reasons seem to apply.For example,Quester has suggested that if a belligerent misunderstands a peace signal war termination will be delayed.A good example of this occurring was the Japanese decision to surrender in

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[26] Lewis Richardson,'War Moods',Psychometrika,vol.13 (3)Sept and Dec 1948.

[27] Lewis Richardson,'War Moods I',Psychometrika,vol.13 (3)Sept 1948,pp.154-159.

[28] Fred Charles Iklé,Every War Must End(New York and London:Columbia University Press,1971),pp.9-13.

1945.In early 1945,junior Japanese officials secretly sent peace feelers to the Americans,which were not acted upon by American diplomats,possibly because the Japanese 'doves' were regarded as too junior and not representative of the Tojo government.[29]

In a different vein,Fred Iklé also noted that conflicting military advice could delay the ending of war.For example a civilian leader may want to know whether a military situation could be stabilised before agreeing to withdraw.This decision is clearly dependent on the quality of military advice and the reliablity of military estimates regarding an enemy's intentions and military capability.The process is further complicated by differing military perceptions forcing military leaders at all levels to favour one report over another.[30] For example,in March 1943,the Italian leader Benito Mussolini was warned by his military advisers that Germany faced imminent defeat in Russia.He was also warned that a German defeat would be disastrous for the Italian military position.Despite these grim reports,Mussolini chose to fight on confident of victory.[31] History proved him wrong.

'Re-orientation' was the second major issue examined by theorists concerned with the domestic aspects of war termination. This was a term used by Paul Kecskemeti and

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[29] George Quester,'Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals,'Annals,Nov 1970,pp.32-33.

[30] Iklé,pp.19-37.

[31] ibid,pp.34-5.

referred to a process whereby political and military leaders decided to disengage from a war.There are many reasons for this change of heart.It may occur due to the belief that further resources spent on continuation of the war will be wasted for few or no gains,or it may result from the convergence of values,or the perception that the war is immoral.In addition,leaders may calculate that the state might not be able to afford additional defence expenditure.[32]

When it comes to 're-orientation,'Richardson and Randle have suggested that war weariness is a critical factor.According to Richardson,for war weariness to develop there must be a body or group of 'pre-war'defeatists within a society.As the war progresses war weariness will spread through the population by internal dissent.[33] The longer the war,the more war weariness will grow.[34] War termination will arise when about half the survivors demand peace.[35] Robert Randle has outlined other reasons why war weariness develops. The political mood might dramatically change because of defeats on the battlefield,or because of the threat of invasion or because there is no end to the war in sight.[36]

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[32] Paul Kecskemeti,'Political Rationality in Ending War,' pp.108-115.

[33] Lewis Richardson,'War Moods II',Psychometrika,vol.13 (4)Dec 1948,pp.210-212.

[34] Lewis Richardson,'War Moods II',p.215.

[35] Lewis Richardson,'War Moods II',p.227.

[36] Randle,pp.77-79.

The internal struggle to terminate the war is a painful and sometimes lengthy process.For a politician it means admitting defeat and conceding that previous policies were wrong.Politicians closely associated with the war might be removed from office in a General Election.Field commanders,might be sacked or overruled by General Staff.[37] Small wonder then that fighting is more often preferable to war termination.

Ceasefires and Peacemaking

In the war termination literature,'Peacemaking' is the complex interaction between six variables:the type of war being fought;war aims;domestic politics; coalition relations; the military situation;and 'de-ideologisation.'[38] Randle's book,The Origins of Peace, deals comprehensively with the peacemaking process.Pillar's study is more limited in its scope,confining itself to studying ways of securing agreement during the bargaining process,which necessarily involves studying both military and diplomatic tactics to generate political results.

Randle makes five crucial points about the peacemaking process.His first,and perhaps most obvious,point to make is that different types of wars have different outcomes.For example,a war can end in victory,defeat or stalemate. Second,the peace process becomes more complicated if many states and/or alliances take part in the negotiations.

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[37] Halperin,pp.94-95;See also Iklé,Chapters 4-5.

[38] Randle,The Origins of Peace,pp.18-23.

Accommodating the wishes of all the participants is extremely difficult and necessarily involves compromise and horse trading.[39] For instance,the Versailles Peace Settlement of 1919 involved the Allied victors and the defeated Central powers.The peace process was complicated by the divergent aims of Britain,France and America.Clemenceau and Lloyd-George wanted to punish the Germans,while President Wilson was more interested in granting self determination to the empires of the vanquished powers.

According to Randle,peace-makers are also influenced by wider political considerations.They might be concerned with the effect of a peace agreement on surrounding states or they might have limited bargaining power.[40] During the Franco-Indochinese war U.S.military planners considered using American planes to aid the French garrison in Dien Bien Phu.Fear of what China might do tipped the balance in favour of non-intervention,a decision which possibly weakened the French bargaining position at the peace talks in Geneva.

Randle also outlined the ways in which domestic politics can delay or speed up the peace process.First, divisions between policy-makers produce delays and indecision.[41] Second,under a process called de-ideologisation,a side revalues its priorities,downgrades

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[39] ibid,pp.25-429.

[40] ibid,pp.18-23.

[41] ibid.,pp.430-42.

war aims and,by so doing decides to negotiate.[42] .

Both Randle and Pillar identify several phases in the peace process.According to Pillar there are three phases in peace negotiations.Phase one is the period of uncertainty, and mistrust.[43] The main problems in this phase are procedural,the main question being:'When is the best time to open peace talks?'[44] Negotiations will probably open once parties,'arrive at a common view of the future course of a war,and both become aware that they hold such a common view.'[45] This occurs if the military situation is impossible to reverse,if resources are exhausted,or if one side can bring more resources to bear on an opponent.[46] For example during the Franco-Algerian War peace talks opened after the failure of the Challe Plan to destroy the FLN.The first phase could be compared to the first stage in the final of a karate championship.Each athlete,tired and wary after the qualifying rounds,circles the other,looking for a place to attack,looking for weaknesses in the opponent's defences.

In the second phase,both sides have a reasonably clear idea of the substantive issues dividing them and also a fairly good grasp of each other's motives.'They believe

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[42] ibid,pp.13-14.

[43] Paul Pillar,Negotiating Peace:War Termination as a Bargaining Process,(Princeton NJ:Princeton University Press,1983),p.102.

[44] ibid,pp.53-58.

[45] ibid,p.59.

[46] ibid,p.59.

that a bargaining range exists and hence that a negotiated peace is possible.'[47] This phase usually ends after each side has made a large concession.[48]

In the final phase there are usually several distinct issues to be resolved.These may include handing over prisoners,deciding on demarcation lines or new boundaries,and setting time limits for troop withdrawals. Usually both sides will make concessions.[49]

Tactics to secure agreement vary.They may include military coercion,de-escalation or other activities, which have already been outlined in the military section on war termination.Diplomats can impose deadlines to secure compliance from an opponent.Mendes-France successfully used this tactic at the Geneva Peace talks in 1954.Or one side may take a hardline approach and refuse to make concessions.This policy may be due to fear of arousing discontent amongst one's own people.[50] Frelimo successfully used this tactic at the Lusaka peace talks from June to September 1974.

Randle agrees that there are three phases.[51] In fact Pillar's three stages could fit neatly into Randle's idea of a preliminary stage of peace talks,and a secondary one,involving the resolution of the military issues at

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[47] ibid,p.112.

[48] ibid,p.119.

[49] ibid,pp.121-130.

[50] ibid,pp.207-8;217-19.

[51] Randle,p.5.

stake.Yet Randle,in marked contrast to Pillar,calls his final phase the 'political settlement.' This is the most difficult part of the war to resolve because it involves legal issues and because,although at peace,one side may seek to overturn the treaty terms.[52]

Randle therefore echoed an earlier study by Nicholas Timasheff who argued that a peace treaty either entirely terminated a war,with everyone content with the settlement,or relegated the war to 'deeper levels of social inter-action.'[53] In other words it caused resentment. For instance Germany never accepted the territorial limitations imposed on it at Versailles in 1919.Peace was merely a truce.[54]

War Termination Hypotheses

Following this review of the literature on war termination we now have to turn each of the theories into a testable proposition.For the sake of clarity,each of the propositions will be grouped under separate headings. Unfortunately,not all of these hypotheses can be examined,because some of the pertinent archives have not been opened to the public.For this reason it is particularly difficult to test Sigal's ideas about bureaucratic politics and war termination.For example,it is

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[52] ibid,p.14,486-93.

[53] Nicholas Timasheff,War and Revolution,(New York:Sheed and Ward,1965),p.233.

[54] ibid,p.234.

almost impossible to test the following hypothesis:'War termination is delayed because of bureaucratic infighting' For this reason the analysis in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight will concentrate on the ideas of Richardson, Iklé, Randle,Halperin,Handel and Rothstein.They are more testable because they deal with observable behaviour revealed by opinion polls and changes of government.

For the sake of convenience the hypotheses under discussion have been grouped into six categories-'Victory, termination points, de-escalation, public opinion and prolongation of war, re-orienation and ceasefires and peacemaking.

Victory

1)Victory occurs in a colonial war when one side wins the hearts and minds of the people.

2)Victory is the,'cessation of armed conflict under conditions satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms of stated objectives.'

3)Victory involves the creation of a relationship between two parties,with one gaining superiority over the other.

Termination Points

4)The loss of a capital city or other major asset indicates the ending of a war.

5)A qualitative shift on the battlefield renders the outcome irreversible and indicates that a war will soon end.

6)Successive battlefield defeats and high casualties indicate the ending of a war.

De-escalation

7)De-escalation occurs because of military setbacks or the pressure from public opinion.

Public Opinion and Prolongation of War

8)War termination is delayed because public opinion will not permit the ending of war.

9)War termination is delayed because of the conflict between'hawks' and 'doves.'

Re-orientation

10)Reorientation occurs because of war weariness.

11)Re-orientation involves a change of regime.

Ceasefires and Peacemaking

12)Successful peace talks require common areas of interest on which agreement can be reached.

13)Diplomats use a variety of tools and techniques to reach peace agreements.These tools are useless if the political will to terminate a war does not exist from the outset.

14)Durable peace occurs when all sides are content with the political and military outcome of a war.

We will now test these premises against the reality of four case studies to see whether they stand up or need modification.However,before we can test the validity of

these premises we have to examine the aims and strategies of the belligerents involved in these wars.

Chapter Two

Counterinsurgency and Revolutionary Warfare

This chapter is designed with the lay reader in mind rather than the expert,for without a review of the aims and methods of the belligerents,the reader risks being lost in a world of unfamiliar places, people, ideologies and military strategies.First of all we will examine the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategies of France,Britain and the Portuguese.Then we will analyse the Revolutionary Warfare strategies of the Vietminh,the FLN (National Liberation Front),the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) and Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique).

Strategies of the Colonial Powers

Our analysis of COIN is based upon the approach used by John Baylis when he examined COIN and Revolutionary Warfare.He divided COIN into a number of different dimensions:military;socio-economic;political and psychological.[55]

The Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategies of France, Britain and Portugal had much in common.Each colonial power aimed to defeat the internal aggression in their respective colonies and win over the colonial citizens to their cause.As will be seen in our discussion of the O'Connor and Carroll theories,the colonial powers had varying degree of success.

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[55] J.Baylis,'Counter-Insurgency Warfare,'in Baylis et al,Contemporary Strategic Thought,(London:Croom Helm,Second Edition,1987.)

The respective military operations of the three colonial powers were similar.All used local recruits in their struggle against guerrilla forces.Colonial troops had three main roles.First they had to guard protected villages,army outposts and communication links from guerrilla attacks.Second,troops conducted offensive sweeps against guerrilla forces.The aims of these offensive operations were to destroy guerrilla bases,capture rebel commanders and locate and capture enemy weapons.The third task was to gather military intelligence about rebel positions, combat strength,location of bases and arms caches.The French in their campaign against the Vietminh and the Portuguese in their struggle against Frelimo placed more emphasis on the military aspect of COIN than their British counterparts in Malaya.

The socio-economic aspects of COIN had several components. First the colonial powers set up walled villages.Second,the colonial powers increased spending on education and welfare.All three powers regrouped people into walled villages to protect villagers from attacks by insurgent forces.The colonial powers increased spending on education and welfare,in the hope that reforms would attract people to their cause.

Portugal for example moved people into aldeamentos,or walled villages.The aim was to starve the guerrillas of local support.Situated by roads,making them easy to supply and reinforce if attacked,the camps were surrounded by trenches and barbed wire, resulting in the nickname

'concentration camps' a pejorative term difficult for the regime to brush aside.In theory,the aldeamentos were to provide amenities such as health care, education, regular food and water supplies and protection from guerrilla attacks and coercion.[56] By 1973,the Portuguese commander in Mozambique,General Arriaga boasted that over 1 million people were living in aldeamentos.[57]

The third dimension was political.All three colonial powers tried to cultivate political parties in the hope that these could undercut nationalist support.Early in the Malayan Emergency,the British sponsored a rival national party to the MCP.Ideally,this new party would oppose the MCP, foster good relations with the Malays,recognise British law and policy,and finally recognise 'the connection between the morale of local Chinese society and internal security.'[58] This resulted in the Malay Chinese Association being formed during December 1948.[59] The political aspect of French COIN in the Indochinese war became known as the Bao Dai solution,which was a French attempt to set up Emperor Bao Dai as a rival to the

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[56] A.Isaacman and B.Isaacman,Mozambique:Colonialism to Revolution,1900-1982,(Boulder Colorado:Westview Press, 1983),pp.100-101;T.H.Henriksen,Mozambique: A History, (London:Collings,1978),pp.193-195;and B.F.Jundanian, 'Resettlement Programs:Counterinsurgency in Mozambique,' Comparative Politics,Vol.6(4),July 1974,pp.522-525.

[57] The Times,30 July 1973.

[58] A.Short,The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, (London:Frederick Muller,1975),p.262.

[59] Short,pp.266-267.

Communist Ho Chi Minh.

The fourth dimension of COIN involved psychological warfare.In Algeria for example,the French created 'Psychological Action Bureaux' to make French soldiers immune to revolutionary propaganda,and to distribute French propaganda leaflets to Muslim people.[60] From April to July 1956 the French stepped up their psychological warfare activities,with the creation of the Psychological Action and Information Service (SAPI) in April and in July the first four operational companies of SAPI who were given names such as Leaflet and Loudspeaker were ready for service.Also in July 1956,the army published its own psychological warfare pamphlet.[61] Colonel Jules Roy,a Frenchman touring Algeria records that the posters extolling the virtues of French democracy and liberty were to be seen everywhere from billboards to road signs.[62]

The French and Portuguese conducted similar COIN strategies to the British,yet they failed to win the hearts and minds of their colonial inhabitants.Britain differed from France and Portugal in one major respect.The British were willing to concede independence relatively early on during their campaign against the MCP.

The British success in Malaya contrasts starkly with

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[60] ibid,pp.184-185.Psychological Bureaux officers were distributed down to battalion level.

[61] E.O'Ballance,The Algerian Insurrection 1954-62,(London: Faber and Faber,1967),pp.78-79.

[62] J.Roy,La Guerre D'Algerie,(Paris:Rene Juillard, 1960),p.24.

the failure of French and Portuguese COIN.France and Portugal wanted to defeat internal aggression and retain their colonial possessions at the same time.This internal contradiction was their Achilles heel.Given the choice of independence or psuedo-independence many of the colonial inhabitants opted for self rule.

Revolutionary Warfare Strategies

The four insurgent movements attempts to win the hearts and minds of their compatriots had several aspects.Propaganda was filled with attacks on unpopular practices such as taxation and landlords who charged too much rent.This local aspect was broadened by propaganda against colonialism.The revolutionary movements discussed in this thesis fused local grievances and national grievances into a powerful crusade against colonialism.The insurgent movements' principal attraction lay in their vision of an independent,egalitarian,democratic and economically prosperous society,and this utopian vision gave the Vietminh,the FLN and Frelimo a decisive edge over the French and the Portuguese colonial powers,who,for domestic reasons,were reluctant to grant independence.

The four insurgent movements examined in this thesis had one paramount aim:they wanted to gain independence.In addition,all the four movements were prepared to fight for their freedom.

The Vietminh and the MCP were both Communist.The MCP fought for the creation of an independent Communist state,

the same objective of the Vietminh in French Indochina,led by Ho Chi Minh.The MCP,Frelimo and the Vietminh also wanted to abolish feudalism in their countries.All wanted to end the powers of tribal chiefs and redistribute land to the peasant farmers.

None of the revolutionary movements were democratic in the Western sense of the term.In the newly independent countries,the movement which won the military struggle against the colonial power would have the dominant political voice.The Frelimo leadership for exampleleaders saw to it that their party would be the sole political party,although all citizens would have a role in decision-making through a system of direct democracy at village, cooperative and district levels.[63] The lack of a democratic leadership may have been due to the pre-emomence of the military in the liberation movements.For example,in Algeria and Mozambique,the revolutionary army would be central to the transformation of society and the process of nation building.[64]

Political parties which refused to accept the leadership of the revolutionaries were usually eliminated. The Vietminh for example,had no qualms about killing rival political leaders who stood in their way.In his memoirs General Giap refers to "groups in Hanoi [who] had the task

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[63] Eduardo Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambique,(London: Zed Books,1983),pp.163-196.

[64] Machel,S.'The Peoples' Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique,'in Munslow,B.(ed).Samora Nachel:African Revolutionary,Translated by Michael Wolfers.(Zed Books:1985),pp.53-54.

of suppressing reactionaries" -which is clearly a euphemism for killing opponents.[65]

The insurgent military strategies of the Vietminh,the FLN,the MCP and Frelimo shared may things in common.The military strategies used by the four independence movements were based upon Mao Tse Tung's theory of revolutionary warfare.It will be recalled that Mao's theory of revolutionary warfare had three stages.There is the defensive phase involving hit and run operations,setting up a secure rear base area.The next stage is the strategic stalemate,where the aim is to 'expand cell structures in inkblot-like fashion'across the country.Finally there is the strategic counteroffensive,the conventional phase of the war.[66]

Each of the independence movements adapted Mao's ideas to their respective countries.The MCP strategy was similar to Mao's three stages,although there was a major difference.Whereas Mao concentrated his efforts on Chinese peasants,the MCP concentrated its efforts to win landless Chinese labourers on the rubber plantations to the MCP cause.Accordingly,the MCP three phase strategy was the following:first,attack isolated tin mines and rubber plantations.Second,set up liberated areas.Third,attack town

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[65] Vo Nguyen Giap,Unforgettable Months and Years.Translated by Mai Elliott.Data Paper 99,South East Asian Program, (New York:Cornell University Press,1975),p.55.

[66] Baylis,p.218.

and cities with conventional forces.[67] As will be seen,the war never really went beyond the first stage,and the MCP eventually lost the war in 1960.

The Vietminh leaders General Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh adapted Mao's ideas to a country with a high illiteracy rate,isolated villages and poor communication links.[68] The Vietminh targeted villages as the most likely bases of potential support,and later on we will see that the village bases were an resilient bulwark against foreign penetration.

Giap also modified Mao's strategy,by including an additional two phases-known as preparatory phases.The first preparatory phase was the psychological warfare stage,involving the formation of revolutionary cells,the setting up of secure bases and distribution of propaganda. Second,there was the small unit phase when army companies are formed,as well as political associations.[69] The three remaining stages of Giap's five phase strategy were identical to Mao's three revolutionary warfare stages.

It is difficult to ascertain a date for each stage of the Vietminh strategy in the Franco-Indochinese War.Stages one and two lasted from August 1945 to December 1946.The defensive phase began during December 1946 and lasted upto September 1950.The Strategic stalemate began during

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[67] E.D.Smith,Counterinsurgency Operations:Malaya and Borneo, (London:Ian Allen,1985),p.7.

[68] D.Pike,The Vietcong,(Cambridge MA:MIT Press,1968),p.32.

[69] ibid,p.36.

September 1950 and lasted to the end of the war.As John Baylis says,the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was strictly speaking not part of a strategic counteroffensive, because the battle was only based in one remote part of Tonkin Province.[70]

The FLN strategy and tactics were formulated at the Soummam Conference in 1956.FLN tactics were closely modelled on the ideas of General Giap and Mao Tse Tung.[71] Ideally,there were to be three phases.The first phase would consist of terrorism,hit and run tactics,with the aim of seizing ammunition,expansion in the mountain area,and winning villages over to the FLN cause.The so called 'Guerrilla Stage' lasted for twenty months.[72]

The second phase of the FLN campaign was the protracted war stage.Protracted war began in 1957 with the movement of guerrilla activities to urban centres-such as Algiers.In addition the FLN gained the usage of Tunisia and Morocco as military bases from which to supply forces inside Algeria,harass French forces,then retreat into supposedly neutral territory.The protracted stage of the war lasted until 1959,and after that,because the French were too strong,the FLN had to revert back to small scale terrorist operations.There was no conventional stage in FLN strategy,because the FLN were not militarily strong enough

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[70] Baylis et al,p.218.

[71] O'Ballance,p.205.

[72] ibid,pp.205-206.

to launch conventional attacks on colonial forces.[73]

Frelimo's strategy was formulated at the Second Congress held in Niassa in July 1968.Frelimo strategy was also based on Mao's ideas.The Frelimo leadership had no doubt that the war against Portugal would be a protracted war.In addition the war would be a Peoples war,with an emphasis on gaining the support of the population,rather than militarily defeating the Portuguese. Frelimo's military strategy thus contrasts with the Vietminh and FLN,both of which aimed to inflict a military defeat on the colonial power.

In common with the MCP and the Vietminh,Frelimo aimed to set up 'liberated areas,'that is,areas which the guerrillas militarily controlled.In the liberated zones agricultural cooperatives were to be set up,and for the first time rural people were to have authority over their own lives,rather than living under the thumb of Lisbon or tribal chiefs.[74]

Summary

The wars examined in this thesis were very similar.All stem from a conflict between the old and new,colonialism versus independence,feudalism versus modernisation.All three colonial powers stood like sand against the wind of change blowing through their empires.

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[73] O'Ballance,p.206.

[74] B.Munslow,Mozambique:The Revolution and its Origin, (London:1983),pp.107-110.

We now have to see how far the war termination theories can throw light on the outcomes of the four wars examined in this thesis.After this general discussion about military strategy it is perhaps fitting that the premises developed by O'Connor and Carroll about 'Victory' should be examined first.Since the colonial powers had to concede indepedence,it is appropriate to discuss how and why, according to war termination theory,this occurred.

Chapter Three

Karl Von Clausewitz observed that war is politics by other means.Politicians decide when to declare war and who to attack,leaving their soldiers to fight and die on the battlefield.When a war ends it can have three military outcomes-victory,defeat and stalemate.The military outcome of the war determines whether or not the political objectives have been achieved.This chapter will examine one of these outcomes-victory.

Our analysis will be based upon an examination of two definitions of the word,'Victory' postulated by Raymond O'Connor and Berenice Carroll respectively.Accordingly,the chapter will be divided into two sections.The first section will examine O'Connor's idea.He believed that victory must take into account the objectives of the belligerents,with reference to the situation at the end of a war.The next section will examine Carroll's idea of 'Victory'.She believed that 'victory' described the relationship between two opponents in which one side has gained the upper hand.

'The cessation of armed conflict under conditions satisfactory to at least one of the combatants in terms of stated objectives.'(O'Connor)

Britain's paramount aim in Malaya was to defeat Communist Insurgency.The British believed that the only way to beat Communist insurgency was to establish strong democratic,self governing states in South East Asia,even if

logically this policy meant the loss of British colonies to eventual independence.[75] The British were successful.The MCP was defeated.Malaya was granted independence in 1957 and since then has developed along broadly democratic lines.Clearly,in terms of stated objectives,Britain was victorious in Malaya.

Unfortunately O'Connor's idea of victory is difficult to apply to the Franco-Indochinese War because of the difficulty in deciding who won this war.At one level it seems that France was the clear loser.When the war ended in 1954 she had lost control of most of Tonkin and North Annam.Only with the help of two religious groups did she manage to hang on to Cochinchina.When looked at in another light however,things did not turn out so badly for the French.Paul Marie de la Gorce has observed that if the French had accepted Ho Chi Minh's demands for independence in 1946 then the whole of Vietnam would have fallen under Communist control.Arguably,since only half of Vietnam lay in Communist hands in 1954 France could claim a partial victory.[76]

Ironically the Vietminh only partially achieved their initial war aims.A Communist republic was set up in the Northern Vietnam province of Tonkin and North Annam,but Cochinchina remained a separate state(and it would not be

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[75] Ritchie Ovendale,The English Speaking Alliance,(London:George Allen and Unwin,1985), pp.144-152.

[76] P.M.de la Gorce,Apogee et Mort de la Quatrieme Republique,(Paris:Bernard Grasset,1979,),pp.262-263.

until 1975,that a united Vietnam would be formed.)[77] Vietminh dissatisfaction with the outcome meant that peace in Indo China would be short lived.

The Algerian case meets O'Connor's criteria of victory more easily.France's principal aim from 1954-1960 was to protect the French empire against the FLN's demand for independence.France was not defeated on the battlefield.At war's end,France controlled all of the cities on the Mediterranean coast.However,in 1962 the FLN achieved their aim of an independent Algerian state governed by the leaders of the FLN.Hence,the war's outcome was satisfactory to the FLN.

O'Connor's definition of victory also seems appropriate in the context of the Portuguese war in Mozambique.Portugal's central aim was similar to that of France in Algeria-the preservation of its empire.In common with the Vietminh,the MCP and the FLN,Frelimo wanted to remove all vestiges of colonialism.In terms of this stated aim,Frelimo achieved its objective with the creation of an independent Mozambican state at the Lusaka Peace talks in September 1974.Portugal was the clear loser.

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[77] Anthony Eden,Full Circle,(London:Cassell, 1960),pp.140-142;and Robert Randle,Geneva,1954, (Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1969), pp.342-349.

'The Creation of a Relationship between Victor and Vanquished'

The Malayan Emergency

The British experience in Malaya provides a clear example of how a colony's geographical situation can help a colonial power fight an insurgency.According to Robert Thompson, Britain's biggest advantage was Malaya's relative isolation from Communist China and North Vietnam.In addition Thailand was hostile to Communism and denied the MCP sanctuary.[78] In practice this meant that MCP had no genuine secure rear base areas in which to train guerrillas.The Thais also helped Britain patrol the Thai-Malay border.One such operation took place in January 1953.[79]

Racial divisions in Malayan society also helped the British.Apart from European expatriates, there were three main racial groups-the Malays,the Indians and the Chinese.The MCP derived its support mainly from the Chinese community,while the Indians and Malayans tended to support the colonial power.Indians did not support the MCP and Lucian Pye believed this was because the British treated the Indian community well-for example,Medicare was provided

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[78] Robert Thompson,Defeating Commmunist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam,(London: Chatto & Windus,1966),pp.18-20.

[79] John Cloake,Templer:Tiger of Malaya,(London:Harrap, 1985),p.299.

by the Indian Immigration fund.[80] Many Muslim Malays refused to support the MCP because of its atheistic doctrine.[81] Malayan support for the British was crucial,as Short points out:

> 'If the insurrection had been supported by the Malay community to anything like the extent that it was by the Chinese it could not have been won by the British forces.'[82]

The Chinese community comprised about 40% of the total Malayan population,but it seems that only the Chinese squatter community supported the MCP.[83] According to Short the Chinese felt alienated from society because of the reluctance of many Malayan rulers to confer full citizenship rights to them.[84] Stubbs cites Malay leaders in Kedah and Perak as saying that Chinese citizenship would mean the 'delivery of Malaya to the Chinese.'[85]

The British thus enjoyed a large advantage.Only a relatively small section of the Chinese squatter community actually supported the MCP.Chinese grievances were economic and social,and the bulk of British COIN was devoted to alleviating them.Finally,Malay and Indian support for

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[80] Lucian Pye,Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1956)Pye,pp.56-58.

[81] ibid,pp.48-50.

[82] Short,pp.270-271.

[83] ibid,pp.256-259.

[84] ibid,pp.260-1.

[85] Stubbs,p.117.

Britain was vital and meant that the MCP could not truly claim to be a national party,unlike Frelimo or the FLN for instance.

The third reason for British success was the British cultivation of a rival national party to the MCP.Early in the Emergency the British recognised the need for a third force to rival the Communists.During 1948 the High Commissioner,Henry Gurney,tried to set up a Chinese party to rival the MCP. Ideally,this new party would oppose the MCP, foster good relations with the Malays,recognise British law and policy and finally recognise 'the connection between the morale of local Chinese society and internal security.'[86] This resulted in the Malay Chinese Association being formed during December 1948.[87] The British also involved colonial citizens at cabinet level and this change took place in March 1951,when the British Governor of Malaya,Henry Gurney,set up a cabinet administration out of the colony's Executive Council.The cabinet included senior locals such as Dato Onn,who became Home Affairs Minister,and Tunku Yaacab,the brother of Tunku Rahman,Malaysia's first Prime Minister.[88] General Templer speeded the localisation process.By the time he left Malaya at the end of 1954 five Malayan political leaders were serving in the Federal War Executive Council.[89]

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[86] Short,p.262.

[87] ibid,pp.266-267.

[88] Miller,p.103.

[89] Miller,p.164;and Cloake,p.312.

We can see that the creation of a clear victor/ vanquished relationship was due to the following reasons:Malaya's relative isolation from friendly Communist states;the narrow base of support for the MCP;and the fostering of a rival nationalist party.The British experience in Malaya is markedly different from similar colonial wars fought in Algeria,Indochina and Mozambique, where the French and Portuguese generally fought a multiracial opposition,lacked a strong third force and were surrounded by hostile states which tended to offer 4sanctuary to insurgent forces.

The French War in Indo-China

Carroll's idea of victory is not easily applied to the Franco-Indochinese War because neither France nor the Vietminh emerged as clear victors in the military sense of the term.Instead,the result was a partial victory for both sides.At wars end France held Cochinchina whilst the Vietminh held Tonkin and parts of Annam.The creation of of a fudged relationship between partial victors was due to the following reasons.First,the Vietminh managed to fuse peasant grievances into a crusade against the colonial regime.Second,the Vietminh played upon peasant superstitions.Third,they ruthlessly suppressed rival opposition groups.The principal reason for French success in Cochinchina was that France had the support of two

indigenous political groups called the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.

In North Vietnam the Vietminh exploited the widespread peasant grievances against the colonial regime.In 1946 there were many peasant grievances.Heavy taxation and high rents were hated.Peasants did not like to pay tax to Hanoi or Saigon.Absentee landlords,especially those in the north,were hated,because they set high rents.[90]

Not surprisingly the Vietminh targeted the villagers as potential bases of support.[91] When the French flushed the Vietminh out of the cities into the countryside from December 1946 to March 1947,the Vietminh set up workers cells and peasant committees in villages in Tonkin and Central Annam.[92] The proliferation of Vietminh controlled villages after March 1947,gave the Vietminh a strong political base-chiefly in Tonkin.[93]

The Vietminh successfully played upon peasant superstitions,in particular the concept of the 'mandate of heaven.' This concept means that rulers can only govern if they have the consent of heaven or God.Once God has removed his mandate then the old order falls and a new one starts. This idea was relevant to developments in post-war

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[90] Alexander Woodside,Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam,(Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976),pp.156-157;and John.T.McAlister and Paul Mus,The Vietnamese and their Revolution,(New York and London:Harper Torchbooks,1970),pp.120-121.

[91] McAlister and Mus,p.138;and Pike,p.47.

[92] Pike,p.47;and Kelly,p.82.

[93] McAlister and Mus,p.51,111-113.

Indochina.World War Two shattered the colonial myth for good.An Asian power,Japan,had demonstrated the weakness of the Western colonial powers,Britain,France and the Netherlands.Western powers,from a peasant point of view, were like defeated gods,no longer a worthy focus for Asian loyalties.[94] In September 1945 Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnamese independence.The old Emperor Bao Dai abdicated and for a time joined the new government.From a peasant viewpoint the abdication of the Confucian Emperor(symbol of the old order) suggested that the Mandate of Heaven had shifted from France to the Vietnamese.[95]

Finally,the Vietminh were more ruthless than their opponents,and they had no qualms about killing political leaders who stood in their way.The entire Trotskyite leadership was eliminated by the Vietminh.In October 1946,a rival group called the Dong Minh Hoi were eradicated.The leader of the Constitutional and National Independence Party was murdered,so too was the leader of the Pro-French Tonkin Party.[96] Ngho Dinh Khoi,the brother of the future President Diem,was assassinated as well.[97]

Yet the Vietminh remained weak in Cochinchina,which is why the Vietminh only partially achieved their aims. Vietminh weakness allowed France to emerge as a partial

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[94] McAlister and Mus,pp.59-69.

[95] Short,A.The Origins of the Vietnam War,(London and New York,1989),pp.41-45.

[96] Pike,p.44.

[97] B.Fall,Street Without Joy,(London:Pall Mall Press,1963),p.27.

victor in the war.Vietminh weakness in Cochinchina was a consequence of competing with three other groups for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people-the French,and two religious groups,the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao.These last two groups had a great deal of support amongst peasant villagers.[98]

The Hoa Hao were a Buddhist group who offered salvation to its followers.Peasants supported the utopian vision of the movement,and since it aimed to fight foreign aggressors,the Hoa Hao could also claim to be a bone-fide nationalist group.[99] The Cao Dai supported a revival of Confucian values which they believed were being eroded by Western values.[100] Since these two religious groups hated the Vietminh more than they hated the French,they joined the colonial power,giving France a decisive edge over the Vietminh below the thirteenth parallel.[101]

Peasant grievances,a secure rear base area and the ruthless elimination of opponents allowed the Vietminh to emerge as partial victors.Conversely France was strong in Cochinchina mainly because she was helped by two indigenous groupings,the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.

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[98] Woodside,pp.182-183.

[99] ibid,pp.188-192.

[100] ibid,pp.185-188.

[101] Scholl-Latour,p.33.

The Franco-Algerian War

Carroll's idea of 'Victory' can be applied to the Algerian War.By war's end in 1962,a peculiar situation arose whereby France,who was the military victor,conceded independence to the FLN.In fact France conceded independence for domestic political reasons,and these reasons will be discussed later on in Chapter Nine which specifically deals with War Termination and Domestic Politics.This section,however,only deals with the military aspects of war termination.There were three reasons for the French military victory.

Over a period of five years from 1954-1959 France developed and slowly perfected an Coin strategy known as 'Quadrillage.' This strategy required thousands of men to undertake surveillance duty.The quadrillage strategy created a huge security blanket across Algeria.This was the strategy's chief strength,and FLN activities were greatly hindered as a result.

However the quadrillage strategy had one serious weakness,which was eventually rectified by De Gaulle.It tied down thousands of men in defensive roles,at considerable cost to offensive operations.Horne believes that only 15,000 men(out of over 400,000) were assigned to offensive operations against the FLN.The quadrillage strategy was too slow and sluggish to deal effective blows against a mobile,elusive enemy.[102]

The French solved this problem in 1959 by implementing

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[102] Horne,p.331-332;and O'Ballance,p.131.

what is known as the 'Challe plan' after its namesake General Maurice Challe.[103] It seems that the main aim of the Challe Plan was to make sure that,'the FLN could not inflict on the French a military reversal significant enough to impinge on diplomatic negotiations'-which is what happened at Dien Bien Phu,the decisive battle in the Indochina War.[104] Militarily the Challe plan was a success.The FLN was forced to operate with smaller companies of men rather than whole battalions.The FLN was believed to have lost about 15000 men during operations in the latter half of 1959.Morale was low in FLN ranks, illustrated by some men's refusal to cross the Morice line from Tunisia to Algeria because it was too dangerous.[105]

A second reason for the French military success was the construction of a line of border defences which became known as the 'Morice line of defences' after the French commander in charge of the operation.The Morice Line hindered FLN activities in Algeria and prevented a conventional phase of FLN strategy,because the wall blockaded over ten thousand FLN soldiers in Tunisia for most of the war and hindered the supply of FLN guerrillas inside Algeria.[106] The wall effectively cut off contact between Tunisia and Algeria.[107] On many occasions the FLN

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[103] Talbott,p.145;and Horne,p.569.

[104] Talbott,p.145.

[105] O'Ballance,pp.135-137.

[106] Horne,pp.263-265;and O'Ballance,p.120.

[107] Kelly,p.158.

tried and failed to breach to the Morice Line. [108]

Third,the French managed to drive the FLN out of major cities.In February 1957 French trooops forced the FLN to evacuate Algiers.In a bloody two month campaign in the Algerian capital city the FLN suffered at least three thousand fatalities.[109] Defeat in Algiers seriously weakened the FLN.Its political arm,the OPA was destroyed,and the FLN Command Council,the CCE, was forced to evacuate to Tunisia.[110] Terrorist incidents lessened.[111]

The Portuguese War in Mozambique

The most accurate description of Portugal's position is that of military deterioration rather than outright defeat.In one sense then,Carroll's idea of 'victory' is inappropriate.Yet it is still necessary to examine the reasons for the war's outcome.There were several long term factors which were responsible for Portugal's deteriorating position in 1974.We will discuss Frelimo's success at winning the hearts and minds in Chapter Four.Other important factors were:the failure of the political and social dimension of Portuguese COIN,the spread of Frelimo liberated areas,Portugal's failure to contain the rebels and Frelimo sanctuaries in the bordering states of Zambia

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[108] Horne,pp.253-254.

[109] Horne,p.202.

[110] Heggoy,p.239;and Talbott,p.88.

[111] Talbott,p.88.

and Tanzania.

In Chapter Two,(pp.29-33) we saw that Portugal adopted a similar COIN strategy to the British in Malaya.We saw that there were several dimensions to the Portuguese campaign: military;socio-economic;and political.Portugal spent money on infrastructure such as the Cabora Bassa Dam and regrouped people in 'aldeamentos' or walled villages. However,the socio-economic and political aspects of the Portuguese campaign suffered many drawbacks.The aldeamentos fell short of idealistic expectations.Amenities such as adequate food and water supplies and fertile land were in short supply in some villages.[112] Frelimo guerrillas managed to penetrate the villages and some villagers acted as rebel informers.[113]

It is quite probable that atrocities by Portuguese soldiers also discredited the Portuguese cause.The most infamous atrocity was the Wiryamu massacre of 16th December 1972,when 400 people were murdered.[114] Black Mozambicans disliked the way in which the perpetrators of the Wiryamu Massacre of December 1972 were let off so lightly without even prison sentences.[115]

The most glaring failure of Portuguese COIN was the failure to develop an alternative ideology to the one

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[112] Jundanian,pp.537-538.

[113] ibid,p.519.

[114] Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution,p.135.

[115] The unit's commander was dismissed. Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution, p.133,139.

expounded by Frelimo.In contrast to the British sponsorship of rival nationalist groups during the Malayan Emergency,Portugal made little attempt to seek the support of rival nationalist parties.Portugal only belatedly decided to foster the support of an alternative nationalist party.In 1974 Portugal allowed the Grupo Unido do Mozambique(or GUMO) to participate in elections,but GUMO arrived too late on the political landscape to be effective because it had no chance to develop grass roots suppport.[116] Portugal did not offer the prospect of a new,more democratic,more egalitarian society-just watered down colonialism.Small wonder then,that many blacks refused to support the colonial power.

The failure of the Portuguese COIN greatly helped Frelimo to set up 'liberated zones' in areas where Portuguese control was weak.These areas tended to be in the northern provinces of Niassa,Cabo-Delgado and Tete.The 'liberated zones' were important because they acted as forward bases from which to attack the Portuguese-it was from Tete,for instance,that the rebels launched their first attacks into Central Mozambique in July 1972.Liberated zones also enabled the guerrillas to form an embryonic Mozambican state based on equality and justice.[117] This gave a degree of legitimacy to the guerrillas' cause,which they would not have gained if the rebels were based

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[116] Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution, p.101,110.

[117] Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambique,pp.191-2.

exclusively in Tanzania and Zambia.Within the liberated areas the guerrillas could offer the prospect of a new society-something which the Portuguese could not do without jeopardising the regime in Portugal.

Finally,the Frelimo campaign was greatly helped by the sanctuary offered by neighbouring states,especially Tanzania.[118] Tanzania for example provided military training camps for Frelimo.[119] Eduardo Mondlane admitted that Frelimo had training camps at the Tanzanian village of Bagamoyo.[120] According to Le Monde,Tanzania was the base from which Frelimo launched its campaign into Cabo Delgado in September and October 1964.[121]

Henriksen regards the Portuguese failure to attack guerrilla bases in Tanzania as a fatal error.[122] However, attacking Tanzania and Zambia would have escalated a colonial war to an interstate war in Africa with dangerous consequences for Portuguese relations with African and Western states.In addition,resources would have been stretched since as well as fighting wars in Angola and Guinea Bissau,another opponent would have had to be

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[118] Colin Legum,'The End of the last Western Colonial Empire,'Current Affairs Bulletin,Vol.51, No.3, August 1974,p.9.

[119] R.D'A Henderson,'Relations of Neighbourliness,' Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.15, No.3,1977,p.441.

[120] Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambique,p.128.

[121] Le Monde,10th and 23rd October,1964

[122] Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution,pp.206-207.

fought.There was also the danger of a more active involvement by China and Russia. Thus escalation to reverse a worsening military situation would have been extremely risky to Lisbon.

Summary

O'Connor's defined 'victory' as the attainment of political objectives with reference to the situation at war's end.His idea seems applicable to the cases.Britain defeated the MCP in 1960.The Indo-Chinese war ended in stalemate in 1954 with the Vietminh and France both partially achieving their objectives.Algeria gained independence in 1962.Frelimo's desire for an independent Mozambican state was attained in 1974.

Berenice Carroll's idea of 'Victory' as the relationship between victor and vanquished,seems applicable to Malaya,Algeria and Mozambique.The British emerged as the victors in Malaya and wiped out the MCP.France and the Vietminh were partial victors in the Indo-Chinese war. France emerged as the military victor in Algeria but the FLN secured a political victory as seen by the attainment of independence.In Mozambique Frelimo beat the Portuguese. We also found that secure rear-base areas,external support, and a sound military strategy pave the way to victory in a colonial war.

However,Carroll's idea of victory is too permissive, fails to explain why victory occurs and ignores the partial attainment of aims.Therefore,a new definition of victory

containing military and political elements seems necessary. Military victory includes the capture of major strategic assets,the destruction of an opponents economic infrastructure, territorial conquest,and the infliction of massive casualties. Political 'victory' includes the attainment of independence,the right of secession and removing an opponent's government from office.The final outcome of a war can be measured by comparing the military and political objectives of the belligerents at the beginning, with the military and political situation at the end.

Chapter Four

Introduction

This chapter examines the idea of 'Victory' as a 'process' by focusing on an idea suggested by Raymond G.O'Connor.He argued that the side which wins the hearts and minds of a population will win a war of liberation.The purpose of this chapter is to test his idea against the reality of our four case studies.

Testing O'Connors idea about hearts and minds is not an easy task because we are dealing with a psychological rather than a physical dimension.We have solved this problem by looking at quantifiable or observable behaviour which are techniques used by educational psychologists to measure the success or failure of an education policy.

We will look at the following types of observable behaviour:the number of military incidents in a particular area,the scale of the violence,the geographical extent of the war,casualty figures and desertion rates (when available) and the numbers of villages under colonial or insurgent control.These types of behaviour allow us to paint a detailed picture of events.

Victory occurs in a colonial war when one side wins the hearts and minds of the people.(O'Connor)

Figures released by the British government show that in the Malayan Emergency there were widespread surrenders of MCP guerrillas from 1957-60,indicating demoralisation in the MCP rank and file membership.Often guerrillas became

disillusioned with the cause and believed that their comrades were dying for nothing.Some hated the rigours of Communist life and particularly the self criticism. Moreover,the Malayan government offered generous surrender terms and considerable financial rewards.[123]

The most notable MCP leader who surrendered was Hor Lung,the Johore State Secretary who turned himself in on 5th April 1958.He had several reasons for doing so.Malaya was now an independent state,and the MCP was now fighting against a legally elected government.He recognised that the people wanted peace and an improvement in their living conditions.Hor Lung eventually persuaded 160 guerrillas to surrender and he was awarded $247,000 for his pains.[124]

If one looks at the battle casualties between 1952 and 1954 it is also clear that the British had gained the upper hand and were on the road to victory-although,admittedly, that was still six years away.In 1952,two hundred and sixty three members of the Security forces were killed by the MCP,with a further 92 killed in 1953 and 87 in 1954.[125] MCP 2losses for the same period were significantly higher:1,535 killed in 1952,1,404 in 1953 and 985 in 1954.[126] Clutterbuck estimated that about two thirds of the MCP had

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[123] R.Clutterbuck,The Long,Long War,(London:Cassell, 2nd Edition,1967),pp.96-107.

[124] R.Stubbs,Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, (Singapore:Graham Brash,1989),pp.252-54.

[125] Clutterbuck,Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaya,1948-83,(Singapore:Graham Brash,1985),p.189.

[126] ibid,p.189.

been eliminated by the time Templer left in 1954.Not surprisingly,the number of terrorist incidents dropped throughout the period as well,from 500 per month in 1952,to 100 a month in 1954.[127]

Further evidence of the British success were the first appearance of 'white areas' so called because they were deemed free from Communist activity.Part of Malacca was declared 'white' in September 1953.[128] By June 1954 about 1.3 million Malayan citizens lived in 'white' areas.[129] Indeed,by 1955 about 50% of the Malayan population lived in areas outside Communist influence and control.[130]

The picture that emerges is one in which the colonial power won over a large number of citizens to its cause.The appearance of the white areas and the reduction of guerrilla attacks clearly indicate British success.Far from progressively losing control in the later stages of the insurgency the British were regaining their footholds.This state of affairs contrasts with the French and Portuguese experiences.

In the French Indo-Chinese War,the Vietminh were successful at winning people over to their cause.The first indication of this can be seen in the rising number of recruits to the Communist Party during the period 1945 to 1949.Figures for Communist Party membership are as follows:

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[127] ibid,p.186.

[128] Short,p.378.

[129] Stubbs,pp.179-180.

[130] Short,p.379.

5,000 in August 1945,20,000 by the end of 1946,rising to 50,000 by the end of 1947,jumping to 180,000 by the end of 1948 and soaring to 700,000 by the end of 1949. Gabriel Kolko estimated that about one third of the membership was based in Cochinchina.[131]

The second Vietminh success can be seen in the number of villages which they controlled.Buttinger estimated that by 1952 the Communists controlled just under a quarter of the villages in the Red River Delta.[132] By the middle of 1953 the Vietminh had further tightened their grip on the Tonkinese villages,controlling five thousand villages and hamlets in the Red River Delta.[133] This represented a massive power shift from the French to the Vietminh.

The next indicator of Vietminh success can be seen in the geographical scope of the military violence.In December 1952 the Vietminh edged nearer to Laos,and on 9th April 1953 they entered Laos.[134] By the end of April 1953 insurgent forces reached the outskirts of the Laotian capital city of Luang Prabang.[135]

Peter Scholl-Latour observed that by mid 1954 the Vietminh were operating in battalion strength and moving

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[131] Gabriel Kolko,Anatomy of a War,(New York:New Press,1985, 2nd edition 1994),p.46.

[132] J.Buttinger,Vietnam:A Political History,(London:Andre Deutsch,1969),p.323.

[133] J.Dolloz,The War in Indochina,1945-54,Translated by Josephine Bacon,(Dublin:Gill and Macmillan,1990), p.147-161.

[134] Buttinger,p.350.

[135] Peter MacDonald,Giap,(London:Fourth Estate,1993),p.108.

around by day rather than night.His observation is significant because it meant that the Vietminh could operate at battalion level by day in Tonkin.This would have been difficult without village support.[136]

The scale of the violence also suggests that the Vietminh won large numbers of people over to their cause.During 1951 to 1954 the Vietminh launched large-scale military operations against the French in the provinces of Tonkin and Central Annam.The best known example was their attack on the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in which the Vietminh used heavy artillery for the assault.Over 200,000 Vietnamese peasants assisted the Vietminh in their attack on Dien Bien Phu.These people were were promised land in return.[137]

The Vietminh won the hearts and minds of many of the inhabitants in Tonkin.Village support and the growth in Communist Party membership enabled the insurgents to move freely in northern Vietnam and extend the violence into neighbouring Laos.The successful hearts and minds campaign in the north was reflected in the political outcome of the war.

Unfortunately,we cannot firmly conclude which side won the hearts and minds in the Franco-Algerian War.Both sides could reasonably claim some success in their campaigns.We will deal with French COIN first.

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[136] Peter Scholl-Latour,Death in the Ricefields,(New York: Viking-Penguin,1986),p.76.

[137] Kolko,pp.59-60.

In Chapter Two(p.29) it was pointed out that France used walled villages to protect Algerians from FLN terrorism and provide basic amenities such as food,shelter and schooling.If one judges success by the numbers of Algerians housed in walled villages then one could say that France was fairly successful in winning the hearts and minds of the Algerian people.For example,Alistair Horne claimed that by July 1959 over one million people had been regrouped into walled villages.[138]

A good example of successful regroupment was the town of Sidi Salem.Here,houses were built of brick and stone and food supplies came regularly.Moreover,Algerians volunteered to live in the town and from 1956 to 1958 its population rose from 11,500 to 17,000. Terrorist attacks in the area near the town dropped from 186 attacks in 1956 to a mere 80 in 1958. Unfortunately for the French,Sidi Salem was the exception rather than the norm.[139]

Colonel Jules Roy concluded that in general French efforts to regroup people into walled villages alienated people instead of winning them over.This was because many Algerians were forcibly removed from ancient tribal homelands.Thousands chose voluntary exile in Tunisia and Morocco in order to avoid being regrouped.[140]

Poor conditions inside the camps probably cost the French much support and goodwill.Inadequate sanitation,

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[138] Horne,p.338.

[139] Heggoy,pp.220-221.

[140] Roy,pp.78-79,165-70.

disease,barbed wire fences,income controls and travel limitations all contributed to the 'concentration camp' atmosphere.[141] Like birds in a cage the camp inhabitants may have been safe from attack,but they were not spared the ravages of disease nor were they free.

If a situation arises whereby an insurgent force has the military and logistical capability to attack a variety of targets in different areas,one can reasonably surmise that guerrilla forces have the support of the populace.The best example of this in Algeria was the Battle of Algiers in 1957,which began inJanuary and ended six months later. The FLN had several motives for attacking the capital of the French colony,but the two main ones were the desire to boost popular support with a dramatic military success and the desire to sow chaos in the heart of the French command structure.[142]

The French response was swift and brutal.By torturing suspected terrorists and aided by fifteen hundred informers the French quickly gained an accurate picture of the FLN command structure.Six months after the FLN began their assualt the violence stopped.[143] Algiers was quiet afterwards with a large reduction in terrorist incidents beginning in October 1957 and lasting through to December

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[141] Heggoy,pp.183-4.

[142] G.A.Kelly,Lost Soldiers:The French Army and Empire in Crisis,1947-1962,(Boston:M.I.T.Press,1965),p.191; Horne,p.190; and Heggoy,pp.233-44.

[143] Horne,pp.191-4; Talbott,p.85; and O'Ballance,p.80.

1960.[144]

Although the FLN lost the Battle of Algiers,their ability to carry the war to the French administrative capital suggests that many Algerians supported or at least sympathised with the FLN.In addition,it is quite likely that French heavy-handedness alienated many potential supporters and drove them into the welcoming arms of the insurgents.

Both the FLN and France could claim success in their respective hearts and minds campaigns.The FLN's ability to launch attacks in Algiers suggests that Algerians living there had been won over to the FLN's cause.The crass heavy-handedness of French regroupment policy angered Algerians,causing many to support the FLN or flee abroad to Tunisia and Morocco.The French could claim that one million people had been moved into walled villages and could also claim that after the Battle of Algiers there was a major reduction in FLN attacks in Algiers and towns such as Oran.

O'Connor's emphasis on the importance of winning the hearts and minds in a colonial war is supported by events in the Portuguese war in Mozambique. Analysis of the scope of the war,numbers of military incidents and the scale of the violence show that Frelimo was successful in winning popular support.

Frelimo relentlessly extended its guerrilla operations as the war progressed.In 1964 war broke out in the two northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado.By 1969

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[144] Talbott,p.88.

Frelimo attacks were spreading westwards into the province of Tete.Three years later,in July 1972,Frelimo moved south, despatching guerrilla units into the Central Mozambican provinces of Manica and Sofala.By the middle of 1974 Frelimo was attacking the Beira railway link to Rhodesia and beginning to move units into Zambezia.The widening scope of the war clearly indicates that Frelimo managed to politicise people in villages across the entire country.[145] Friendly villages provided Frelimo with an ever increasing number of sanctuaries and bases to train in,together with a steady supply of recruits to the cause,places to store weapons and forward bases from which to attack other provinces.

Another type of observable behaviour which indicates a successful hearts and minds campaign is the increasing number of military incidents in a geographical area.Although exact details have never been released, newspaper reports from 1973 onwards point towards a rise in the number of guerrilla attacks on Portuguese troops.

In late 1973 Frelimo launched attacks on Portuguese communication links in north and central Mozambique.The most significant of these occurred on 31st December 1973 when Frelimo derailed a passenger and goods train at Garuso,a hamlet on the Rhodesian border.This incident prompted the London Times to note that the attack was the first,'on this vital link between Rhodesia and the

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[145] A.Hastings,'Some Reflections on the War in Mozambique,'African Affairs,Vol.73,No.293,July 1974,pp.266-268.

Mozambican port of Beira', and that it was,'the farthest south that guerrillas have attacked in Mozambique.'[146] Garuso was 450 miles from Frelimo bases in Tete and 600 miles from sanctuaries in Cabo Delgado.That an insurgent could attack targets hundreds of miles from its rear base areas strongly suggests that Frelimo had much popular support in Central Mozambique.Moreover,the Garuso attack was not an isolated incident;many more attacks followed on this stretch of railway from January through to June 1974.

All this suggests that O'Connor's hearts and minds thesis is fairly persuasive.By winning popular support Frelimo extended its military range.In 1974 Frelimo attacks spread across the country in a bloody crescendo of violence,and Portugal's position grew steadily worse.This situation might never have arisen if Frelimo was solely based in Tanzania or Zambia.It could only have occurred with village support.

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[146] The Times,21 January 1974.

Summary

O'Connor strongly believed that whoever wins the hearts and mind will emerge victorious in an insurgency.His view seems to be correct.The promise of independence and the implementation of social and economic reforms were the critical factors in winning people over to the British cause in Malaya,the Vietminh's cause in Indo-China,the FLN's campaign in Algeria and Frelimo's struggle in Mozambique.The French and Portuguese refusal to offer independence resulted in massive losses of local support at all levels of society and at the village level in particular.

When a colonial power wins the hearts and minds of a population we can expect to see the following results.The Guerrilla's violence will decrease and their attacks will become less frequent.They will resort to using smaller and smaller fighting units.Surrenders and desertion rates amongst guerrilla forces will rise,as also will casualty rates.In addition they will lose control of villages.This vicious circle will eventually lead to the elimination of the insurgent.

Conversely,when an insurgent wins the hearts and minds of the people we can expect an increase in the number of guerrilla attacks.The violence will spread to outlying areas,and insurgents will attack in greater numbers and move across their territory by day rather than night.Desertion and casualty rates for the colonial power will increase.Slowly and inexorably the colonial power will

lose control of its colony as the violence spreads from village to village,district to district and province to province.

Chapter Five

Termination Points

War termination theorists have identified three types of termination point which indicate that a war is about to end.Lewis Coser noted 'symbolic signposts' such as the capture of a fortress or capital city.Paul Kecskemeti and Johan Galtung identified 'qualitative' shifts on the battlefield.Frank Klingberg and John Voevodsky observed that if one side suffers a series of battle defeats and heavy casualties for two consecutive campaign periods,policy makers may decide to terminate a war.This chapter will be subdivided into three parts.The first examines the ideas of Lewis Coser,the second will look at the theories of Kecskemeti and Galtung,and finally the ideas of John Voevodsky and Frank Klingberg will be analysed.

The loss of a capital city or other major asset indicates the ending of a war.(Coser)

Lewis Coser argued that 'symbolic signposts' may indicate that a war is about to end.Examples of these signposts would be the capture of a fortress or a capital city.[147]

There is no evidence in the Malayan Emergency to suggest that Coser's signposts are a necessary prelude to victory.None of the state capitals in Malaya fell to the Communist forces.Nor did the British government lose vast

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[147] Coser,'The Termination of Conflict,'p.350.

tracts of land to the Communists.

The Coser signposts are also very difficult to pinpoint in the French wars in Indo-China and Algeria.In terms of symbols these wars seemed to be stalemated,something obviously untrue of the outcomes.For example,at an early stage of the French war in Indo-China France lost control of much of Tonkin.In 1950 the French lost several key border outposts in north Vietnam-Cao Bang,Dong Khe and Langson.[148] Yet Hanoi,the administrative capital of Tonkin,remained in French hands throughout the duration of the war,and this seems irrelevant to the outcome.

Coser suggested that if a belligerent loses control of something which has symbolic importance,then it could be said that a termination point has been reached.Arguably,in the Franco-Indochinese war,these symbolic values were the villages of the Tonkin Delta.These had symbolic value for both the French and Vietminh,judging by both sides' attempts to win the villagers over to their respective causes.By the middle of 1953 the French estimated that 5000 out of the 7000 villages in the Red River Delta were controlled by the Vietminh.

Unfortunately,in the case of Algeria,Coser's ideas do not apply.The major Algerian cities of Algiers and Oran remained in French hands up to the end of the war.We saw in Chapter Three (pp.49-51) that the French army of half a million men significantly reduced the FLN's ability to

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[148] Davidson,pp.65-91,102;and Fall,pp.29-30.

carry out offensive operations against French towns and villages.This is an important reason why Coser's theory is inapplicable-the FLN lacked the military capability to capture major French administrative centres.

Coser's termination points cannot easily be applied to the Mozambican war either.This war ended in September 1974 but Portugal did not lose any major administrative centres to Frelimo.The capital city Lourenco Marques remained in Portuguese hands throughout the war's duration.Portugal controlled seven of the ten districts in Mozambique which were all situated in the south,central and coastal regions of the colony,whilst Frelimo dominated the three northern administrative districts of Tete,Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

A qualitative shift on the battlefield renders the outcome irreversible and indicates that a war will soon end.(Kecskemeti and Galtung)

Kecskemeti and Galtung both claimed that major qualitative shifts on the battlefield herald an ending to war.For example,if a state lost an asset such as a capital city then a termination point would have been reached.None of the colonial powers examined in this thesis lost control of their major administrative centres in their colonies,so,at one level,Galtung's premise is inapplicable. Yet there were qualitative shifts of a different kind which will now be discussed.

In the Malayan Emergency a good example of a 'qualitative shift' occurring was the adoption of an

effective military strategy by the British.This strategy was the Briggs Plan,which was implemented in June 1950.

The view that this qualitative shift marked a termination point is borne out by the views of the High Commissioner Henry Gurney,and Briggs himself, both of whom believed that 1950-1951 marked a watershed in the war against the Communists. For instance,on June 4th 1951 Briggs and Gurney informed the Colonial Secretary that a 'turning point' had been reached in the Emergency.However, they admitted that the Malayan Government,'lacked the impetus to carry its burden over the crest of the hill and begin the descent to victory.'[149]

It was because the Malayan Government 'lacked the impetus to carry its burden over the crest of the hill' that war dragged on for another nine years.Part of the reason for the weakness of the Malayan government lies in the slow implemenation of the Briggs Plan from 1950-1951.Implementation was hindered by the fact that the military refused to take orders from their civilian counterparts.In addition,within the police force there was bitter rivalry between the Police Commissioner Nicol Gray and his local officers.Briggs advocated the following corrective measures:increased centralisation-in future the High Commissioner would control civil and military operations;all emergency matters to be dealt with at the 3Federal level and increasing police numbers.[150] These

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[149] Short,The Communist Insurrection,p.275.

[150] ibid,pp.250-251.

policy aims were eventually realised when Churchill appointed General Sir Gerald Templer Governor of Malaya on January 13th 1952.[151]

There is some evidence that Kecskemti's and Galtung's idea of a 'qualitative shift' also occurred during the Franco-Indochinese War.This shift occurred between February 1952 and May 1953.After this date the outcome was irreversible for France.In February and September 1952 two important French strongholds in North Vietnam,Hoah Binh and Ngia Lo, fell to the Vietminh.In early 1953 the Vietminh began launching attacks into Laos.By the middle of 1953 the French estimated that 5000 out of the 7000 villages in the Red River Delta were controlled by the Vietminh.[152] The Vietminh attacks on French garrisons indicated a progressive loss of French control in North Vietnam.This was a quantitative shift of such proportions that it amounted to a qualitative shift in power from the French to the Vietminh.Try as she might,France could not reverse this outcome.

Galtung's theory also seems applicable to the French campaign in Algeria.The major qualitative shift on the battlefield occurred during 1959 with the French implementation of the Challe plan. From February to April 1959 the French killed 1600 rebels,captured 460 weapons in the Ouarsensis-Frenda mountain region,and destroyed the FLN administrative structure in the area.On March 28th 1959 the

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[151] Cloake,pp.202-206;and Stubbs,p.140.

[152] Dolloz,pp.147-161.

French killed the commanders of the 3rd and 4th Wilayas.[153] On 22nd July 1959 they launched Operation Binoculars in Grand Kabylia,with side operations conducted in the adjacent Hodna mountains.When the operation ended in October,the French claimed 3746 rebels had been killed.[154]

Ferhat Abbas claimed that after Operation Binoculars,in which the FLN lost about 15,000 of their best fighters,there was no way that the FLN could achieve independence by military methods.[155] The FLN decision in January 1960 to maintain an army in being and reduce operations along the Morice Line,was a direct result of the mauling that they received from the French in 1959.

Galtung's theory of qualitative shifts on the battlefield can also be applied to the Portuguese war in Mozambique.From May 1972 until December 1973 there seems to have been a qualitative shift in Frelimo's favour,with the war spreading from three northern provinces to the provinces of Manica and Sofala in Central Mozambique.[156] Central Mozambique was militarily and economically important to the Portuguese.Frelimo opened a new battlefront in Manica and Sofala,two provinces in Central Mozambique on July 25th 1972.[157] As a result Frelimo gained

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[153] O'Ballance,p.133;P.Laffont,Histoire de la France en Algerie,(Paris:Librairie Plon,1980),p.475;and Horne,p.334.

[154] Horne,pp.335-337;and O'Ballance,134-135.

[155] O'Ballance,p.136.

[156] Hastings,'Some Reflections Upon The War...',p.267.

[157] African Diary,Nov 25-Dec 1,1972,p.6242.

access to the heavily populated centres of Beira,and also the Gorongosa Game Park,which was a popular tourist area.[158] According to Michael Degnan,Frelimo had five hundred guerrillas operating in Central Mozambique,with 50 in the Vila Perry area and another 30 in the Gorongosa Game Park.The guerrillas made their presence felt by launching numerous attacks.[159]

On June 30th 1973,a Spanish surgeon was shot and killed as he landed his light aircraft at Maringue which was situated in Sofala province.[160] More attacks followed.In July 1973 a private plane was shot down near the port of Beira,which indicated that,'the guerrillas have penetrated to an area much further south.'[161] In mid-July 1973,Frelimo guerrillas attacked a tourist camp in the Gorongoza Game park,an area close to the main road linking Beira with the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury.[162] On 31st December 1973,Frelimo derailed a passenger and goods train at the hamlet of Garuso.

Frelimo incursions into Central Mozambique alarmed the Rhodesian Government and probably influenced the Rhodesian decision to increase the length of conscription from nine

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[158] The Economist,14th-21st July,1973,p.34.

[159] M.Degnan,'The "Three Wars" of Mozambique',Africa Report, September-October 1973,p.13.

[160] The Economist,14th-21st July,1973,p.34

[161] The Times,11th July 1973.

[162] The Times,21st July,1973.

months to one year.[163] In a pre-recorded press conference televised on 4th December 1972,Ian Smith said,

'The position in Mozambique has deteriorated because of increased efforts[by Frelimo] to disrupt the Cabora Bassa Project,but the Portuguese ,"believe they will put it right in time and I go along with this."'[164]

The opening up of the new battlefront,the extension of guerrilla operations from north to central Mozambique,and Rhodesian reactions to the new battlefront all support the idea of a dramatic and irreversible qualitative shift on the battlefield.It was no coincidence that these attacks were a precursor to the major deterioration of Portuguese control of Mozambique which began in January 1974.

Successive battlefield defeats and high casualties indicate the ending of a war.(Klingberg and Voevodsky)

Both Klingberg and Voevodsky argued that successive battlefield defeats and high casualties indicate the ending of a war.

Their idea seems to be supported by events in the Malayan Emergency.There were widespread surrenders of MCP guerrillas from 1957-60,indicating large scale demoralisation in the MCP rank and file membership.In Chapter Four(p.59) we mentioned the example of Hor Lung who

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[163] The Economist,December 23rd-30th,1972,p.28.

[164] The Times,5th December 1972.The Cabora Bassa Project was the construction of a dam in the Northern Mozambican province of Tete,which would provide Hydro Electric Power to Mozambique,Rhodesia and South Africa.

surrendered in April 1958.

Klingberg's and Voevodsky's thesis also seems to be supported by events in the First Indochinese war as well. Here,a succession of military defeats over a period of fourteen months forced French leaders to concede that the war was unwinnable.The French garrison at Hoa Binh was attacked and overrun in February 1952.In December 1952 the Vietminh entered Laos.The garrison of Na San was overrun in 1953.These defeats were perhaps even more decisive than the French loss of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, because they had a huge impact on French policy.After these losses,French leaders concluded that the war was lost.With victory out of the question,securing an honourable exit became paramount.Thus,in June 1953 the French Commander in Indo-China, General Navarre,was ordered by Prime Minister Laniel to stabilise the worsening military situation in Laos and northern Vietnam.

This of course means that the battle of Dien Bien Phu did not mark a termination point in the war.The rationale for the Dien Bien Phu airhead was to entice the Vietminh into battle,in the hope that a Vietminh defeat there would strengthen the French negotiating position.[165] This implies that France wished to terminate the war before the battle commenced.[166] Win or lose at Dien Bien Phu,France aimed to pull out from Indo-China.

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[165] Davidson,p.131,155,279;Roy,La Bataille...,p.196;and Fall,Street Without Joy,pp.33-37,74.

[166] de la Gorce,p.79.

The ideas of Klingberg and Voevodsky also seem relevant to the war in Algeria.The two year period from 1957-59 marked a series of military setbacks for the FLN.First,the FLN lost the Battle of Algiers.Second,the French launched the Challe plan in 1959 resulting in heavy casualties for the FLN.The details of these battles can be found in Chapter Three(pp.49-51).Taken together the Battle of Algiers and the Challe Plan fit the criteria postulated by Klingberg and Voevodsky.The FLN suffered a series of battle defeats over a two year period.The military result of the defeats was a scaling down of FLN military operations.

Klingberg and Voevodsky's emphasis on the importance of battlefield defeats and high casualties as an indication of a termination point also seems relevant to the colonial war in Mozambique.Termination points can be identified as far back as July 1972,and in the campaign periods of 1972-3 and 1973-4 we find that Portugal's position in Mozambique slowly deteriorated.

The available evidence shows that Frelimo increased the scale and intensity of violence in the last two years of the war.When we discussed Galtung's idea of a 'qualitative shift',we saw that Frelimo opened a new battlefront in Central Mozambique in July 1972 and also launched many attacks in this area during 1973.

In the first six months of 1974 Frelimo increased its attacks across the country.The provinces of Tete,Manica and Sofala all saw an increase in military violence.For

example,on 6th January 1974 Frelimo launched an attack on Nhacambo village in Tete.A Portuguese farm was attacked in Vila Pery on 14th January.[167] On 2nd February,a freight train was derailed eighty miles north of Beira.[168] By May 1974,Frelimo attacks were edging closer to the capital,Lourenco Marques.For instance,on 9th May Frelimo attacked a bus on the Lourenco Marques-Beira road and killed six people.[169] Earlier in the month it shot down a plane with a Russian made SAM 7 missile.[170] In June a resettlement village 120 miles north of Beira was burned down by Frelimo forces.[171] Frelimo captured the town of Morrumbala near the Malawi border on 12th July after a battle lasting for three days.This was the first conquest of its kind by Frelimo troops.[172]

It is clear that the years 1972-1974 marked a termination point in the war in Mozambique.Klingberg's and Voevodsky's conception of a termination point in which military setbacks and high casualties indicate the ending of a war holds up well in this particular case study.

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[167] The Economist,2nd-9th February,1974.

[168] The Times,4th February 1974.

[169] The Times,13th May 1974.

[170] The Economist,25th May-1st June,1974,p.40.

[171] The Times,8th June 1974.

[172] The Economist,20th-27th July,1974,p.30 and The Times,13th July,1974.

Summary

Coser's idea of 'symbolic signposts' is not supported by any of the case studies considered in this dissertation. It is rare for major cities and towns to be captured in this kind of colonial warfare.This might be be due to the very low levels of violence used by the belligerents. However,Galtung's and Kecskemeti's idea of irreversible qualitative shifts holds up well in our case studies.In Malaya they occurred in the period 1951-54.After this date the outcome of the war was irreversible for the MCP.In Indo-China irreversible qualitative shifts occurred in the years 1952-1953.This is seen by the slow,progressive diminution of French control in North Vietnam.France lost control of 5000 villages in this period,as well as several important strongholds in north Vietnam.This situation was impossible to reverse.

In Algeria the outcome became irreversible after the failure of the Challe Plan to knockout the FLN from their strongholds in Central Algeria.Both sides recognised that the situation was a military stalemate.Peace negotiations followed shortly afterward.In Mozambique irreverible qualitative shifts occurred in the period from June 1972 up to December 1973.New Frelimo battlefronts and an increase in the frequency and scale of Frelimo attacks indicate this shift on the battlefront.These attacks led to the collapse of Portuguese control in 1974.

The ideas of Klingberg and Voevodsky,both of whom suggested that successive battle defeats lead to war

termination hold up quite well and we can assign approximate dates to their hypotheses.In Malaya their ideas are particularly relevant to the period of the Briggs Plan and Templer's governorship from 1951 up to 1954 when the British recognised that they had gained the upper hand.Their ideas also seem applicable to Indo-China,where after June 1953 France actively considered withdrawal from the colony.In Algeria,Klingberg and Voevodsky's ideas seem to fit the period from 1957-1959 which saw the Battle of Algiers and the Challe plan.Military stalemate was the result.The FLN scaled down its military operations and opened peace talks with the French.In Mozambique the termination points occurred in the period 1972-1974.This was a time when several new battlefronts were opened up.

Perhaps these findings allow us to expand on the ideas of Klingberg and Voevodsky concerning battle defeats and war termination by suggesting three new hypotheses. First,when stalemate is the likely outcome after years of fighting, military and political leaders may decide to terminate the war.Second,when violence spreads or when new battlefronts are opened up,then the side facing the brunt of the new wave of violence may decide to cut its losses and terminate the war.Third,if a belligerent perceives that it will suffer massive casualties as a result of increased attacks,it might decide to terminate the war before more lives are lost and before more territory is captured by the opposing side.

Chapter Six

De-Escalation

Introduction

This chapter examines the views of Edward Azar who believed that de-escalation occurred when public opinion concluded that the costs of war have become too high to bear.It seems sensible to assume that the impetus to de-escalate lies with the belligerent on the losing side of a war.

Azar's Theory of De-Escalation

Azar's ideas about de-escalation are not borne out by the British experience in Malaya.Although there is ample evidence pointing to a de-escalation of hostilities from 1957-60,this process occurred because Britain had gained the upper hand in the war,not because of pressure from public opinion.The de-escalation process began during 1957,three years before war's end.It occurred early because of the military successes of British COIN.We mentioned earlier the widespread surrenders of MCP guerrillas from 1957-59,most notably that of Hor Lung in 1958.

We now have to consider why the process of de-escalation took such a long time.During the closing years of the Emergency the British launched, 'federal priority operations' which involved cordoning off villages,the maintainence of a high troop presence and the aim of denying food and sanctuary to the MCP.If these operations were too stringent they could backfire and lead to

riots,which is what occurred at the new village at Semenyih.So the Malaysian government had to be less strict,but time for operations to take effect increased as a result.[173] For example,the Malaysian government conducted a twenty month operation in Johore codenamed Operation Cobble.[174] The British also tried to win over aborigines to their cause by providing them with basic health care and protection from attack.This strategy demanded patience and care.The process of setting up jungle forts,protecting the forts,providing medicare,and persuading tribal elders often took months.[175]

The Police also had to deal with large increases in the number of secret societies,and thus found less time to deal with the insurgency.As the regulations were relaxed,food supplies trickled through to the MCP.Finally,in poorer parts of Malaysia such as North Perak,the MCP still had a relatively strong base of support,and consequently a raison d'etre.[176] These five reasons help explain why it took so long to de-escalate the war.De-escalation in the Emergency also displayed some unusual features not considered by Azar.There was no general ceasefire,nor was there a peace treaty signed by the belligerents.Neither was there any normalisation of

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[173] Stubbs,pp.238-39.

[174] Clutterbuck,Conflict and Violence,pp.231-254.

[175] Stubbs,p.239;Clutterbuck,The Long,Long War,pp.148-152;and Short,The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, pp.439-455.

[176] Stubbs,pp.240-242.

relations between Britain and the MCP.

Did the events of the Franco-Indo-Chinese war support any elements of Azar's theory? In France there were signs of a growing disenchantment with the war as it progressed.This process started in mid-1952,when two Socialist politicians,Alain Savary and Gaston Deferre,refused to vote for additional military expenditure for the Indochinese war.They argued that the war was a waste of lives and precious economic resources,and was unwinnable.[177] On the 15th-16th December 1952 the Socialist party urged the French government to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh.[178]

Nevertheless,despite growing public dissatisfaction with the war France did not de-escalate the violence until an armistice was signed in July 1954.Moreover,it would stretch the English language to say that both sides' normalised their relations.Distrust and hostility are the words which sum up Franco-Vietminh relations from 1945 onwards;distrust and hostility characterised the relationship between South and North Vietnam after 1954.The actors may have changed,but the script remained more or less the same for another twenty one years.

And the Franco-Algerian war does not lend much credence to Azars's ideas about public opinion and de-escalation either.There were signs of a growing

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[177] de la Gorce,pp.62-65,69-71;and R.Irving,The First Indochinese War,(London:Croom Helm,1975),p.62,115.

[178] de la Gorce,p.71.

disenchantment with the war in the period 1960-62.Examples of war weariness include a one hour strike on February 1st 1960 by student and trade unions in protest against the Algerian War.[179] French cinemas released films with an anti-war bias such as Les Liasons Dangereuses.[180] In September 1960 the left wing manifesto of the 121 argued that conscripts had the right to refuse to fight in the Algerian war.[181] Laffont believes that the manifesto had symbolic rather than practical importance-only 500 men are believed to have deserted out of a total army of half a million men in Algeria.[182]

Although there was growing French dissatisfaction with the war from 1959-62,there was neither a reduction in hostilities nor a normalisation of relations between the two belligerents.Continuing violence occurred because of terrorism conducted by the Secret Army Organisation (OAS) and by the FLN in the towns of Algiers and Oran.From February to June 1962,French leaders in Paris were confronted with the task of curtailing violence between several factions of the community.On the one hand there was violence between French settlers and the FLN,and on the other,between the FLN and Algerians who had sided with the French during the war.France could not de-escalate the war because she needed a large troop presence to maintain civil

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[179] O'Ballance,p.157.

[180] Horne,p.415-416.

[181] Laffont,pp.485-486.

[182] ibid,p.486.

order.

There are scores of examples of terrorism in the period from June 1961 to wars end in March 1962.For instance,the OAS killed over 500 people in Algiers in February 1962.On 1st March 1962 the OAS planted a bomb in Oran and the explosion killed 23 Muslims.[183] After the Evian peace agreement was signed OAS terrorism increased.On 23rd March the OAS murdered 7 French conscripts and wounded 11 others.[184] On 26th March the OAS held a series of demonstrations in Algiers.Tirailleur units of Harkis panicked and fired into the crowd,killing 46 and injuring 200.[185] When a truce was signed by the OAS and FLN on 17th June 1962, 2,360 had been killed in a year of civil violence.[186]

The second wave of violence was conducted by the FLN against people it regarded as traitors,and there was also violence in the settlement of old tribal scores.French troops administering the ceasefire had to stand by while thousands of collaborators were executed by their fellow countrymen.Between 30-150,000 harkis,or soldiers who had fought on the French side,were murdered.Entire families were killed,often being tortured before being burned to death.[187] Factional terrorism prevented a de-escalation of

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[183] Horne,pp.513-16.

[184] Talbott,p.232 and O'Ballance,p.197.

[185] Talbott,pp.232-33.

[186] Horne,p.531.

[187] Horne,p.537.

the violence in Algeria.France had to maintain its high troop presence in order to maintain civil order.

In the Portuguese war in Mozambique de-escalation occurred after the coup of April 1974.[188] It was a haphazard affair with soldiers and Portuguese citizens taking the initiative rather than obeying a general order from the Portuguese High Command.

There were many cases of soldiers abandoning the fighting and confining themselves to barracks.In July 1974 soldiers deserted their units or surrendered en masse to Frelimo.Also in that month,2000 men at Boane declared allegiance to Frelimo,as did marines in Zambezia.[189] Fraternisation between Frelimo and Portuguese became more commonplace during July and August.On the 17th July Frelimo and Portuguese soldiers held a goodwill meeting at an army barracks twelve miles from the Rhodesian border-although ironically Frelimo attacked the garrison a day later.[190] Black troops-who comprised 60% of Portuguese troops in Mozambique-began to lay down their weapons in Northern Mozambique.At the end of July, 23 white cattle ranchers in Namacurra allegedly sent a cable to the Frelimo leader Machel asking for 'protection in the future.'[191] At the end of August four newly built Portuguese garrisons in northern

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[188] See Chapter Eight,regarding the April 1974 Coup in Portugal.

[189] Munslow,Mozambique,pp.126-128.

[190] The Times,20th July 1974.

[191] The Times,30th July 1974.

Mozambique were handed over to Frelimo.The move was part,'of a continuing reduction of hostilities between military forces and Frelimo.'[192]

The increased fraternisation between Portuguese soldiers and Frelimo illustrates the demoralisation in the Portuguese army and an acceptance by a large number of soldiers that Portugal had lost the war.One could argue that the public opninion which mattered and which had the biggest effect on de-escalation belonged to the military and settlers.Once they had accepted that the war was lost they de-escalated the violence and normalised relations with Frelimo.Looked at in this light Azar's ideas on public opinion and de-escalation are supported by events in Mozambique,but there are few signs that public opinion in Portugal played a significant role.

Summary

Azar argued that when the pain becomes too great public opinion will force belligerents to wind down hostilities and normalise relations.In Malaya de-escalation followed British military success on the battlefield.There is no evidence that public opinion forced Britain to de-escalate.Moreover,Britain was not able to normalise relations with the MCP because Chin Peng fled to Thailand.In Indo-China there were symptoms of war weariness but it was not strong enough to de-escalate the war.In fact de-escalation only began after an agreement was signed at

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[192] The Times,30th August 1974.

Geneva between the various belligerents.Nor was there a normalisation of relations,a state of affairs undoubtedly related to the Cold War.

In Algeria we found some evidence of war weariness but again this was insufficient to effect a de-escalation of the violence.Civil unrest in Algerian towns and cities continued.Yet when the war ended France normalised relations with the newly independent state.Finally,in Mozambique de-escalation occurred in a fairly haphazard manner with Portuguese troops surrendering in droves in the last three months of the war.At wars end Portugal normalised relations with the new state.

Clearly,Azar's ideas on de-escalation have to be modified to take into account civil unrest,battlefield successes and international political factors such as the Cold War.Relations between belligerents will be normalised if an armistice or peace treaty is signed,or when the war is not part of a wider ideological conflict.Failure to normalise relations can lead to future conflicts.

Chapter Seven

Public Opinion and Prolongation of War

Introduction

This chapter will examine the views of Lewis Richardson and Raymond O'Connor who argued that public opinion can delay war termination.Leaders who fly in the face of public opinion and try and terminate a war will fail.Also will also discussed is Fred Iklé's view that war termination can be delayed by a struggle between 'hawks' and 'doves.' Unfortunately,the closure of state archives makes it almost impossible to see whether there was a struggle between hawks and doves in the Indo-China and Mozambique cases.Attention is therefore focused on the Algerian war where this battle spilled into open violence between various sections of the French community.

'War Termination is delayed because public opinion will not permit the ending of war.'

The behaviour of the French National Assembly from 1946 to 1952 supports the view of Richardson and O'Connor that public opinion can delay war termination.In this six year period all attempts to end the Franco-Indochinese war failed.There were several reasons for this state of affairs.First,Indochina was regarded as an integral part of France.Second,there was the widespread fear,common during the Cold War,that if one colony fell to the Communists others would soon follow.

Charles DeGaulle summed up the French colonial

mentality best when he declared on 27th August 1946:

> 'United with the overseas territories which she opened to civilisation,France is a great power.Without these territories she would be in danger of no longer being one.[193]

For DeGaulle the possession of an empire conferred greatness on the colonial power.In one of History's ironies even the French Communist party supported French colonial policy in the first year of the war.[194]

The second reason why French politicians were determined to fight on in Indochina was the fear of what a communist victory would entail.This fear increased after the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950.From that point on,the war in Indochina was seen as a necessary evil in the fight against Communism.[195] Somewhat ironically,one of the consequences of this anti-Communist climate and the desire to protect the Union was the French reluctance to grant meaningful independence to the Associated states of Indochina,a decision which resulted in a loss of prestige for the Bao Dai government.[196]

The net result of these two French attitudes-fear of Communism and the wish to retain an empire-was pressure to continue the war.Those who tried to end the war were left politically isolated.For example,when,during October 1950,

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[193] Hammer,p.190.

[194] ibid,p.190;and Buttinger,p.279.

[195] Irving,p.153.

[196] ibid,pp.60-62.

Pierre Mendes-France said that France had to reach a settlement with Ho,his plea fell on deaf ears.The Socialists refused to negotiate with the Vietminh and the Republican Party led by Bidault distrusted Mendes-France.[197] Two years were to elapse before France contemplated negotiations with the Vietminh.Richardson's and O'Connor's idea that public opinion can delay the ending of a war seems to be supported by evidence in the case of the French experience in Indo-China.

Richardson's view that public opinion can delay the ending of war is also supported by evidence from the Franco-Algerian War.In this case military and civilian elements in France resisted attempts to terminate the war.French settlers were very influential in the French National Assembly from 1954-59,and from January 2nd 1956 their views were represented by 52 Poujadists,led by their namesake,Pierre Poujade.The party was pro-pied noir,and believed that France must protect her empire.[198] The voices of French settlers were listened to because of the close proximity of Algeria to France and because the colony contained one million French settlers.[199] French governments in the period from 1954-58 were dependent on settler support,the price of which was a hardline Algerian policy.Alfred Grosser sums up the French colonial dilemma

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[197] de la Gorce,pp.62-65.

[198] Horne,p.126;de la Gorce,pp.305-306;and Laffont,p.433.

[199] Richard Vinen,France 1934-1970,(London:Macmillan, 1996),p.159.

thus:

'to give liberty to those in the colonies,governments needed the support of the Communists;to protect liberties at home from Communism,governments needed the support of those who refused to give it to the colonies.'[200]

When the Mendes-France government won a vote of confidence on 12th November 1954,Mendes-France was helped by a group of European settlers,led by Rene Mayer,who urged that France should take a tough stance against the FLN.[201]

The second faction which opposed withdrawal was an element within the French Army.Part of the explanation for the army's behaviour lies in its politicisation during the Indo-Chinese and Algerian wars.War veterans were united by common wartime experiences in Indo-China and Suez,and by a belief that integration,rather than independence was the preferable solution to the war.Veterans also resented French politicians who blamed the army for the loss of the war in Indochina.They were also bonded by a strong streak of anti-Communism and by the belief that it was justifiable to intervene in French domestic politics to further the cause of French Algeria.[202] This last point is exemplified by the hijacking of Ben Bella and other FLN leaders in October 1956 and the Sakhiet bombing of February 1958,in which military planners rather than politicians initiated

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[200] Grosser,p.398.

[201] Horne,p.99.

[202] de la Gorce,pp.435-440;and Behr,pp.132-137.

policy.[203]

In this paranoid climate those who tried to terminate the Algerian war failed.We have two good examples of this in the Algerian War,the first in October 1956 and the second in April 1958.During October 1956 France and the FLN held several rounds of talks in Belgrade.At one of their meetings on the 22nd October 1956,the FLN laid down its demands which included a general ceasefire,recognition of the right to independence and French recognition of the FLN as the sole representative of the Algerian People.[204] The talks came to nothing.

Talbott correctly pointed out that it was politically impossible for the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet to accept the FLN's demands without being toppled from power in Paris by a rightwing backlash led by the ex-Governor General of Algeria,Jacques Soustelle.[205] So strong was the feeling to retain Algeria that opponents of the war were arrested for 'demoralising' the army.[206] A similar proposal for a ceasefire in April 1958 met the same fate.On the 23rd April 1958 the French Prime Minister Pflimlin offered the FLN a ceasefire,but his offer was bitterly opposed by senior French commanders who argued that the 'weight of the dead' made it ludicrous to abandon Algeria.It would mean that French soldiers had died for

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[203] de la Gorce,pp.443-445.

[204] de la Gorce,p.442.

[205] Talbott,p.73;and de la Gorce,p.355.

[206] de la Gorce,p.355.

nothing.The army's concerns about the abandonment of Algeria were very evident in the joint letter written by Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Allard and Massu to General Ely the army Chief of Staff in Paris,on the 9th May 1958.The four generals expressed deep concern at the abandonment of Algeria and the Muslims they had sworn to protect,and warned that the army was in a desperate state.[207] Unless France preserved French Algeria,then the Army would 'feel outraged by the abandonment of this national patrimony.One cannot predict how [the army]would react in its despair.'[208] Four days later the army participated in a coup which toppled the Fourth Republic.

It is clear that two elements in France opposed war termination-right wing elements in the French National Assembly and the military.Both groups believed that since Algeria contained a million French settlers France had the duty to defend them.Some also thought that empires conferred greatness on the colonial power.For war termination to occur the military and right wing supporters of French Algeria would have to be overcome.

As far as the Portuguse war in Mozambique is concerned,it is difficult to argue that war termination was delayed because of the pressure of public opinion.We have no evidence that Portugal opened peace talks before the April 1974 coup.Nor do we have any public opinion surveys pointing to Portuguese support for the war.Our analysis is

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[207] Fauvet,pp.346-347;and de la Gorce,p.526.

[208] Horne,pp.281-282.

based upon newspaper reports and journal articles from the period 1964-1974.Based upon these sources it appears that Portugal had at least three reasons for fighting the war in Mozambique.First was the ideological importance attached to fighting the Communist backed Frelimo movement. Second was the belief that empires granted prestige.Finally the colony was economically important to Portugal.These reasons may have strongly influenced public support for the war.

The Portuguese regime under Salazar and his successor Caetano was anti-communist and the Portuguese government did not want Mozambique and Angola to fall into the hands of the Marxist Frelimo movement.The correspondent for Le Monde argued that the Portuguese really believed that they were defending the Atlantic from Communist forces who were regarded as the epitome of evil in Lisbon.[209] The maintainence of an empire was also regarded as prestigious.On 2nd December 1969 Noguerira the Portuguese Foreign minister told the Lisbon National Assembly:

> 'It would be absurd to say the least,if we Portuguese,who have at our disposition an extensive economic space favoured by solid political unity,were to destroy the one and break the other,abandoning a construction where we have everything in order to integrate in something else which is dominated by others and where we should be nothing.'[210]

He meant that Portugal would be small and weak without her

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[209] Le Monde,10th December 1965.

[210] African Diary,1-7th January,1970,p.4776.

colonial possessions and if she joined a bloc such as the European community,Portugal would be dominated by other countries.

Finally,it is worth remembering that the colony was economically valuable to Portugal.In 1968 the Financial Times wrote that,'with Angola and Mozambique showing signs of being big money winners for Portugal,any talk of the country pulling out of Africa seems unreal at this stage.'[211] We have many examples suggesting that Mozambique was a ,'big winner.'

Mozambique was the site of the Cabora Bassa Dam project,which aimed to provide hydro electric power to Mozambique,Rhodesia and South Africa.[212] In addition,the ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques were used as exporting outlets for Zambia and Malawi.During 1965 21% of Mozambique's international payment receipts were derived from transit earnings.[213] In 1968 Zambia exported 15-20,000 tonnes of copper per month which went via Rhodesian railways to Beira and Lourenco Marques.[214] Mozambique contained natural gas deposits near the town of Beira and rich mineral deposits in the north eastern provinces.[215] Based upon this analysis it seems sensible to assume that

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[211] The Financial Times,13th November 1968.

[212] The Guardian,3rd December 1966.

[213] Jennnifer Davis,'Allies in Empire,'Africa Today, vol.17(4),Jul-Aug 1970,p.14.

[214] The Financial Times,26th November 1968.

[215] The Guardian,30th December 1966.

Mozambique was just too valuable a colony to let go.

War Termination is delayed because of the struggle between 'hawks' and 'doves.'

Fred Iklé compared the war termination process to a struggle between hawks and doves.Only when this battle is resolved can a war end.His views are illustrated by an examination of the efforts to end the Franco-Algerian war.Here army and settler 'hawks' were pitted against civilian 'doves.'The contest was a violent and bloody affair involving Frenchmen killing Frenchmen,a settler rebellion in 1960,a coup attempt by French generals in 1961,and the total collapse of civilian authority in Algeria from 1961 up to the war's end in March 1962.

Charles De Gaulle faced a major challenge to his political authority in January 1960.On the 18th January the French leader met FLN leaders and agreed to hold future negotiations on Algeria.[216] Although these talks were about procedures for peace negotiations,whites in Algeria became alarmed. Fearful of their long term future,a small group of settlers took to the streets in Algiers and errected barricades on January 24th.[217] Unlike Guy Mollet who,in a similar incident in 1956 capitulated to the Algerian mob,De Gaulle was made of sterner stuff.He refused to make any concessions to the French settlers and after a tense week

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[216] Kelly,pp.263-264.

[217] Behr,pp.163-164;Laffont,p.478;Talbott,p.158;and Kelly,p.270.

the rebellion petered out.[218] The defeat of the settlers saw the removal of a major obstacle to peace.From now on only the French military was in a position to thwart the peace process.

Fourteen months after Barricades Week a small group of French officers took the drastic step of staging a coup which aimed to topple De Gaulle.The coup leaders-Generals Jouhaud,Zeller,Challe and Salan-were veterans of wars in Indochina and Algeria,and all felt that De Gaulle was betraying French intersts by holding peace talks with the FLN.They also thought De Gaulle was putting Algerian collaborators into grave danger.[219]

On 22nd April 1961 these four generals staged a coup in Algiers which spread to Oran.Fortunately for De Gaulle and the peace process the coup was a fiasco.Few junior officers were prepared to sacrifice their military careers for the sake of the French colony,and because of its very narrow base of support the coup was quashed three days later.[220] Unfortunately,this coup was not the 'hawks'last word on the Algerian problem.

Like a poisoned rat which runs about maniacally shortly before dying,a group of French settlers and disgruntled French soldiers set up the Secret Army

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[218] Behr,pp.170,247-251.Talbott,pp.159-160;O'Ballance,p.150; and Kelly,pp.275-77.

[219] Horne,pp.441-444;Talbott,pp,183,204-205;and Kelly,p.316.

[220] Horne,pp.445-459;O'Ballance,pp.170-185;Kelly,pp.311-324;Talbott,pp.204-210;Laffont,pp.496-497;and Behr,p.183.

Organisation(OAS) and tried to dish the peace process with a terrorism campaign.Although the OAS ultimately failed to derail the peace process, Algeria was plunged into complete anarchy from May 1961 up to March 1962. Whites killed whites and whites killed blacks in a bloody killing spree which spread from Algiers to Oran and on to Paris.After a year of mayhem and destruction over 2,300 lay dead.

Summary

Richardson suggested that public opinion can delay war termination.A brief summary of our findings is as follows.

In Indochina,French politicians believed that empires conferred great power status and prestige.After 1950 the war became a Cold War theatre and fear of Communism became yet another reason for continuing the war. Politicans who urged a withdrawal were lone voices lost in the din of anti-Communism and imperialism.In Algeria,French politicans were driven by the desire to protect the livelihoods of one million French settlers.The settlers blocked two attempts to end the war in 1956 and 1958.The system of proportional representation gave the settlers a political voice disproportionate to their numbers.In Mozambique the Portuguese leaders were motivated by three considerations. They believed that possessing an empire conferred greatness.They were also staunchly anti-Communist. Finally,they thought the colonies were too valuable economically to let go.

Fred Iklé argued that war termination involves a

struggle between hawks and doves.We tested his idea on the Algerian war and in general our findings vindicate his view.There was a lengthy and bloody battle between settler and military hawks and civilian doves which lasted from 1954-1962. Settlers blocked peace efforts in 1956 and 1958,staged a rebellion in January 1960 and the army led an abortive coup in April 1961.

Chapter Eight

Introduction

'Re-orientation' means a shift in direction or change of course.When referring to the war termination process re-orientation refers to the shift from prosecuting a war to actively seeking ways to end it.The re-orientation process has two main characteristics.First,Robert Randle and Lewis Richardson have argued that war termination is possible after a change in public opinion.Second, Morton Halperin and Robert Rothstein believe that when a war becomes unwinnable there will be a change of regime or the replacement of military commanders.This chapter will be divided into two sections and will examine each of the theories in turn to see whether historical reality supports them.

War Termination occurs when public opinion turns against the war.

The ideas of Richardson and Randle on public opinion and war termination seem to be supported by events in the Franco-Indochinese war.Here the political reorientaion began in mid 1952,when several politicians such as Alain Savary and Gaston Deferre refused to vote for additional military expenditure for the Indochinese war.They argued that the war was a waste of lives and precious economic resources and was militarily unwinnable.[221] On the 15th-16th December 1952,the Socialist Party urged the French

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[221] de la gorce,pp.62-65,69-71;and Irving,p.62,115.

government to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh.[222]

We now have to consider why the war dragged on for another nineteen months.First,the French government wanted to negotiate from a position of strength.Therefore it had to stabilise the military situation.Second,a sudden withdrawal would leave the Bao Dai government vulnerable to attack.This point explains why Laniel obtained $385m from the United States in September 1953.[223] Third,rightwing politicians were still a powerful group in the National Assembly.For instance,the Foreign Minister,Bidault remained unconvinced that the war was unwinnable.He managed to persuade Laniel in December 1953 not to open bilateral talks with the Vietminh,and argued that the best course of action was multilateral talks with the Vietminh.[224] So,for all these reasons the effect of public opinion on the war was delayed,but the basic truth of Randle's and Richardson's hypothesis is unaffected by the delay of a few months.

The ideas of Richardson and Randle on public opinion and war termination also seem to be supported by an examination of the Algerian war.In this case we are fortunate to have some opinion poll findings of the French Institute of Public Opnion(IFOP) from the period 1955 up to

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[222] de la Gorce,p.71.

[223] Irving,pp.117-118;and de la Gorce,p.81.

[224] Irving,pp.117-118;and de la Gorce,p.82.

1963.[225] When De Gaulle first raised the issue of Algerian self determination in a speech on 18th September 1959,the IFOP polled Frenchmen a few days later.Fifty four percent of those polled supported De Gaulle's policy.Only seventeen percent disagreed.[226]

The IFOP predicted that seventy percent of the electorate would vote 'Yes' in the January 1961 referendum on self determination.As it happened seventy five percent of the electorate voted 'Yes.'[227] By May 1961 sixty percent of the respondents polled by the IFOP thought independence was inevitable.[228] In early 1962 the IFOP asked people if they had any sympathy with the French settlers living in Algeria.Over half felt no sympathy whatsoever.[229] Based on this evidence we can discern two important strands in public opinion.We find that there was growing public support for independence and,in addition,by 1962,the pied noirs had fallen out of favour with opinion in Metropolitan France.One could say that the high support for De Gaulle's policies towards Algeria reflected the public mood,which was one of war weariness.One must also remember that France had been engaged in continuous war since 1939-with Germany,then Indochina,then Algeria with scarcely time to

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[225] Ageron,'French Public Opinion and the Algerian War,'in Rioux(ed),p.25.

[226] ibid,p.35.

[227] ibid,p.38.

[228] ibid,p.38.

[229] ibid,p.39.

pause for breath.

Richardson and Randle's idea about public opinion and war termination also seems to apply to the Mozambican war. While not having any opinion poll surveys to support our analysis,we do have evidence of military resentment against the war.There is also evidence that government leaders may have been swayed by the belief that the war was economically too costly.

The war in Mozambique(and the other African colonies) caused much bitterness amongst soldiers.Despite intensive COIN the Portuguese were failing to defeat the insurgents.Some soldiers feared that blame for the failure to defeat Frelimo would be placed on their shoulders, and that officers would face humiliating show trials in Lisbon,which was the fate of those officers involved in the loss of Goa to India in 1961.[230] Pre-coup ideas of the MFA stressed the humiliation of the army:

'The armed forces are humiliated....and presented to the nation as those most responsible for the disaster.'[231]

Soldiers disliked long tours of duty in the colonies. Civilian life was preferable to sweating out four to five years in dangerous African jungles.This is illustrated by the large number of draft evaders during the war's

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[230] P.K.Schmitter,'Liberation by Golpe:Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal,'Armed Forces and Society.Vol.2.No.1. Fall 1975,p.32.

[231] A.Rodrigues,C.Borga,and M.Cardoso,O Movimento dos Capitaes e o 25 de Abril.(Lisbon:1974),p.97.)Quoted in Porch,p.32.

duration.Over 110,000 men avoided military service from 1961-1974,fleeing to France and West Germany.[232] Junior officers disliked the incompetence of their commanders, regarding them as 'too old,too ill and not modern enough to fight a counterinsurgency war.'[233] There were other grievances too.Colonial soldiers lacked social facilities in the jungle.There was a cigarette and chocolate shortage, hospitals proved inadequate and resources were stretched. (South Africa's Southern Cross fund helped provide hospital facilities, while other South African groups donated cigarettes and the like.)[234]

Martin Kayman has argued that Portugal was not economically strong enough to fight a protracted colonial war.Portugal's fundamental weakness was "the divorce of production from the internal market and the accumulation of finance rather than industrial capital."[235]. He meant that the economy was based on financial speculation and low technology industries.In addition,Portugal was not self sufficient due to a weak agricultural system.Wages were low,Portugal having one of the lowest G.N.P. per capita rates in Europe throughout the war's duration.A low standard of living resulted in many Portuguese citizens emigrating to France and West Germany in the 1960s and

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[232] Porch,p.32.

[233] ibid,pp.43-44,47.

[234] Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution,pp.178-179.

[235] M.Kayman.Revolution and Counterrevolution In Portugal. (Merlin Press,London and Wolfeboro New Hampshire,1987), p.13

1970s.In such a fragile economic state,Portugal could not afford to spend 40% of government expenditure on colonial wars-it made no economic sense at all.[236] The logical outcome of such a view is that when too much money is spent for little or no gain,then withdrawal is necessary. Informed public opinion in Portugal increasingly reflected this view.

War Termination involves a change of regime

To some extent,the ideas of Rothstein and Halperin on regime change and war termination can be seen in the Indo-Chinese war.In this case,the most significant political change in the French National Assembly was the election of Laniel as Prime minister in late June 1953.[237] On July 3rd 1953 Laniel declared his desire to grant full independence to the Associated States.[238] There was a new government and a new policy for Indo-China.One could add,by way of an aside,that after July 1953,the French National Assembly was psychologically preparing itself for withdrawal.

The ideas of Halperin and Rothstein concerning the necessity of changing a regime in order for peace to occur can also be seen in the Algerian war.This process was characterised by the banning of rightwing groups,the sacking of rebellious army officers and by a tightening of De Gaulle's grip on Algerian policy.It occurred from 1960

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[236] ibid,pp.1-27.

[237] Irving,p.116.

[238] Grosser,p.288;Fauvet,p.252;and de la Gorce,pp.80-81.

to May 1961.

The first changes followed Barricades Week,the causes of which were discussed in the previous chapter(p.95.) De Gaulle banned the French National Front.Second,the Territorial Army,a kind of European home guard,was disbanded.In a reorganisation of Algerian policy making bodies,a committee on Algerian Affairs was set up in the Elysee Palace.The President and Prime Minister were members of the committee,and from February 1960 until 1962 the committee would make most of the decisions concerning French Algerian policy.De Gaulle thus acquired a tight grip on Algerian policy.[239]

Furthermore,on February 2nd 1960 De Gaulle obtained new powers to legislate by decree.One result was the dissolution of the Cinquieme Bureau which was an army unit specialising in psychological warfare.[240] The French President's position was strengthened both domestically and internationally as a result of these changes.Moreover,the FLN could no longer accuse the French of mollifying pied noirs in Algiers.[241] More changes followed the abortive coup attempt by French generals in April 1961.[242] In May 1961 rebellious officers were put on trial,whilst several Foreign Legion units were disbanded.[243] In short,there is

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[239] ibid,p.162.

[240] O'Ballance,pp.152-153.

[241] ibid,pp.170-171.

[242] Horne,p.459;and O'Ballance,p.180.

[243] O'Ballance,p.181;Horne,pp.459-460;and Talbott,p.211.

plenty of evidence that a change of regime was critical to French withdrawal.

Halperin's and Rothstein's ideas on war termination involving a changing of regime are also supported by events in the Portuguese war in Mozambique.In this case,the Caetano regime was toppled by a group of disgruntled army officers.This dramatic change resulted in the opening of peace talks with Frelimo.The origins of the military coup can be traced back to the Rebelo decree of July 13th 1973.Ironically these decrees were a sensible attempt to deal with a chronic officer shortage.After the failure of Operation Gordian Knot in 1970,the army switched to officer-intensive mobile tactical units.The new tactics demanded large numbers of captains and majors.However, Portugal suffered from a serious officer shortage.[244] The main reason for the officer shortage stemmed from the unpopularity of a career in the military.[245]

Thus,on July 13th 1973,the government passed the Rebelo decrees which implemented accelerated courses at the military academy.Conscript officers only needed one or two years at the academy,whereas professional soldiers needed four.This meant that a graduate from university with only one year of service could overtake a soldier who had served four years.This attack on seniority was resented by

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[244] Graham,L.S.'The Military in Politics:The Politicisation of the Portuguese Armed Forces.'In Contemporary Portugal:The Revolution and its Antecedents.Edited by Graham,L.S. and Makler,H.M.(University of Texas Press. 1979.)p.228.

[245] ibid,p.229.

professional soldiers,even though the reasoning behind the scheme was based upon sound military sense.[246] In his memoirs Caetano admits that the reforms caused much disgruntlement amongst soldiers:

> 'There are captains,he told me,who have jumped Lieutenant-Colonels[in seniority.] And he reminded me of the enormous importance a soldier attaches to his seniority on the ladder:'seniority is a job.'[247]

After the Rebelo reform,meetings took place amongst army officers who plotted the downfall of the regime.They succeeded in doing so on April 1st 1974.

Several writers have suggested that the coup leaders became indoctrinated by the African revolutionaries whom they were fighting,and after realising what a dictatorship the Caetano government was,decided to overthrow it.The evidence for this rests on MFA associations being set up in the colonies and soldiers defecting to the insurgents and being subsequently indoctrinated by them.In an interview with a Portuguese soldier called Joao Quelhas, a Portuguese Communist Party member claimed that the PCP managed to infiltate the army and circulate revolutionary propaganda sympathetic to the guerrillas' cause.[248] This is an attractive theory but needs more evidence to support it.

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[246] Kayman,pp.58-61.

[247] M.Caetano,O Depoimento.(Rio de Janeiro.1978.)p.185. Quoted in Porch,p.65.

[248] Munslow,Mozambique,p.126,132.

Summary

Randle and Richardson argued that war termination becomes possible after a shift in public opinion.Here is a summary of our findings.

In Indo-China public opinion shifted against the war in late 1952.The rationale for the shift was that the war was regarded by some politicians as a waste of lives and resources.In Algeria the French public began to grow weary of war in 1960.Successive opinion surveys from the IFOP indicate this shift.In Mozambique the military became war weary.Soldiers were fearful of being blamed for defeat and disliked long tours of duty in the African jungle.The Portuguese government may also have been swayed by the view that war was too expensive to continue.

Halperin and Rothstein argued that war termination involves a change of regime.In Indo-China there was a change of government in July 1953,and with this change came a new policy.France was to disengage from the war.In Algeria DeGaulle sacked military commanders and banned right wing parties.He ruled by decree and limited Algerian policy making to just a handful of advisers.This political consolidation allowed him to end the Algerian war.Change was forced upon the luckless Caetano regime when a small band of army officers overthrew the Portuguese government in April 1974.With the new junta came new colonial polices.Five months later the war in Mozambique ended.

Chapter Nine

This chapter will discuss the theories of Robert Randle,Paul Pillar and Nicholas Timasheff.Accordingly,the chapter will be divided into two sections.The first section will examine the ideas of Randle and Pillar on the subject of bargaining strategies in the peace making process.This is followed by an examination of Timasheff's view that if a peace settlement is unsatisfactory to one of the belligerents then the resulting resentment will undermine the treaty.

Negotiating Peace

Robert Randle and Paul Pillar both maintained that successful peace talks require common areas of interest on which agreement could be reached.Pillar has described in considerable detail the bargaining tactics used by diplomats to secure an agreement.Hardline approaches,the threat of escalation and the imposition of deadlines were some of the methods listed by Pillar as necessary for reaching an agreement.[249] We will now test them against the reality of our case studies.

The Malayan Emergency provides fertile ground to test these ideas on peace negotiations.The British and MCP met at Baling on December 28th 1955 and held talks there for two days.Chin Peng the leader of the MCP demanded the legal recognition of his party but his Malayan counterpart,Tunku Rahman,refused to accept this.Rahman argued that the real

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[249] Pillar,pp.207-8 and 217-19.

issues at stake were whether or not the MCP would accept the British government's amnesty of MCP forces,and its demand that those who surrendered must not engage in activities prejudicial to the state of Malaya.The second demand was unacceptable to Chin Peng since he believed that it would marginalise the MCP in Malayan politics.[250]

Nethertheless the talks resulted in an agreed communique being issued:

'As soon as the elected governments of the Federation obtain complete control of internal security and local armed forces,we will end hostilities,lay down our arms and disband our armies.It does not amount to accepting the present amnesty terms.'[251]

It should be noted here that when Malaya achieved independence in 1957 the MCP did not disband and still continued to fight.Arguably,Chin Peng was not prepared to honour his agreement with the British.

Given the fundamental differences between MCP and the British it is unsurprising that the Baling peace talks failed to produce peace. We see clearly that if there are no common bargaining issues,peace talks will inevitably break down and fail to end hostilities.In a negative way,Pillar and Randle's theories on the essential commonality of interests as a pre-requisite to successful bargaining seem to be supported.

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[250] Short,The Communist Insurrection,pp.463-65;and Miller,pp.189-92.

[251] Short,The Communist Insurrection,p.466.

Pillar described in detail the bargaining tactics used by peace negotiators.There is no evidence that any of these tactics were used at Baling.Each belligerent stated its case in what could be described as a frank exchange of views and neither side insisted on the compliance of the other.There are two possible reasons for the apparent absence of Pillar's bargaining tactics.First,the British were winning the war by 1955 and seemed to have had no domestic compulsion to end it quickly.Second,the MCP was in no military position to force the British to accept its peace terms.

The ideas of Randle and Pillar on the subject of bargaining issues and diplomatic tactics partly explain the outcome of the peace process in the French war in Indo-China.We will look at common bargaining issues first.

Both sides wanted an armistice,although they disagreed on the precise terms of it.France,for example,wanted to forbid Vietminh troops from entering French controlled areas.The Vieminh wanted to exclude from the peace talks Communist forces stationed in Laos and Cambodia.[252] Nevertheless,despite these differences we do see that both sides were agreed on one fundamental point-namely the necessity of an armistice to end hostilities.

The talks began badly for the French.On June 8th 1954,a day after the talks opened,French delegates received news of the fall of the Dien Bein Phu garrison with the loss of thousands of French soldiers.Yet,when the talks

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[252] Randle,Geneva,pp.130-33.

ended a month later,France could reasonably claim a major diplomatic success.The French used two of the diplomatic tactics described by Paul Pillar,namely,the threat of escalation and the imposition of a one month deadline.

The despatching of additional French troops to Indo-China was discussed by Prime Minister Mendes-France and his advisers on June 24th 1954.This decision was later endorsed by the French National Defence Council on June 28th.[253] These decisions clearly reflect the French desire to bolster their bargaining position at the Geneva Conference.

Mendes-France played an important role in the peacemaking process as well.His dramatic one month timetable speeded up the peace process. The deadline also focused delegates minds on the necessity for securing an armistice.It also meant that if the talks ended with no agreement,then all the participants would lose face.[254]

However,Pillar's ideas about tactics to secure an agreement only partially explain the outcome of the Geneva Conference.There was an important additional factor not discussed by Pillar.This was the diplomatic pressure exerted by the Peoples Republic of China and the United States.We will deal with the PRC first.

According to Eden's account of the Conference,it seems that from June 19th up until the middle of July 1954 the

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[253] P.Devillers and J.Lacouture,End of a War: Geneva 1954,(London:Pall Mall Press,1969),pp.255-58;and Randle,Geneva 1954,p.306,312.

[254] Devillers and Lacouture,pp.181-83;and Randle,Geneva 1954,p.249.

Vietminh were put under a great deal of pressure by China,to withdraw Vietminh troops from Laos and Cambodia.On the 19th June,Premier Chou En Lai told the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that China would use its political leverage on the Vietminh to force them to withdraw from Laos.[255] On July 20th the Vietminh agreed to do this.[256] Chou En Lai may well have used his leverage on the Vietminh to force this concession,although it has to be said that the lack of documentation from the Vietminh makes this conclusion difficult to corroborate.

It also seems that America helped bolster the French diplomatic position at Geneva by threatening to send American troops to the colony.This possiblity had been discussed by American and French officials from April through to the first week of June 1954.[257] The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon had both publicly raised the prospect of US involvement in speeches during March and April 1954.[258] This explicit threat of intervention may well have pressurised the Vietminh to reach a settlement,but again,this is difficult to claim with any certainty because the Vietminh have not released any documents pertaining to the peace talks.

At the Geneva Peace Conference from May 8th to July

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[255] Eden,p.129,140.

[256] Randle,Geneva 1954,p.154.

[257] ibid,pp.52-105;and Devillers and Lacouture,pp.73-114.

[258] Randle,Geneva 1954,p.60.

20th 1954,the French managed to salvage peace with honour.If one looks at the settlement terms,France did well at the Conference.The French managed to persuade the Vietminh to accept a demarcation line along the 17th Parallel,even though the Vietminh had considerable control below the 17th Parallel.The French pressed for,and obtained,delayed elections on the unification of Vietnam.This gave the Bao Dai government time to consolidate its position in the South.Third,the Vietminh withdrew from Laos,and the French were permitted to have military bases on Laotian territory.The Conference was a diplomatic victory for the French,and rather less than satisfactory for the Vietminh.[259]

Pillar's ideas on bargaining tactics seem to be supported by the French experience in Indo-China where the threat of military escalation and the month deadline were both helped to secure an agreement.One could also argue that American and Communist Chinese pressure guarranteed the effectiveness of these French tactics at the peace table.

The ideas of Randle and Pillar on common aims and diplomatic bargaining tactics also seem to be supported by events in the Franco-Algerian War.We will deal first with the idea of common interests.

Both sides were agreed on the need to open peace talks and both sides agreed in principle to the idea of a ceasefire.The devil was in the detail however,with both

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[259] Eden,pp.140-42;and Randle,Geneva 1954,pp.342-349.

sides at loggerheads on several fundamental points.For example,France wanted to protect the rights of white French settlers in the newly independent state of Algeria.She also wanted to exclude the Sahara Desert from the peace discussions because she wanted to develop the oil resources contained beneath its shifting sands.Finally,France wanted a ceasefire before the peace talks began.[260] All this suggests that France had abandoned all hope of keeping Algeria in the French Union.In complete contrast to the French climbdown,the FLN stuck to their original war aims laid down at the Soummam Conference in 1956:France had to concede independence;only the FLN could represent the Algerian people,and the Sahara Desert was to remain an integral part of Algeria.We can see that both sides disagreed over the fundamentals prior to the start of the peace talks in 1960.However,it was the French desire to withdraw combined with both sides hope of a ceasefire which kept the talks alive in a somewhat tortuous peace process which was to last two years.

Pillar's ideas on bargaining tactics also seem relevant to the negotiations to end the Algerian war in the sense that the use of a hardline,no concession approach by one of the belligerents led to agreement.An analysis of the various peace proposals shows how this occurred.

The first official talks between France and the FLN were held at Melun in France from 25th-29th June 1960.France wanted a ceasefire to be followed by peace

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[260] Talbott,p.222.

talks.In addition,France refused to let Ben Bella take part in negotiations with senior French officials because he was languishing in a French prison.The FLN refused all of these conditions and insisted on their aims of independence and their right to represent the Algerian people.The talks collapsed without agreement.[261]

By May 1961 France had made significant concessions. They dropped their demand for an unconditional ceasefire, pledged to release thousands of FLN prisoners,and recognised that only the FLN should negotiate on behalf of the Algerian people.[262] At this point of time France had made all the concessions whilst the FLN had made none.FLN success seems to support Pillar's view that hardline approaches do work.

After May 1961 two issues remained unresolved:the territorial integrity of Algeria and settler rights. Disagreement on these issues led to the breakdown of the first Evian talks which took place from May 20th-June 13th 161 and also the Lugrin talks held from July 20th-28th 1961.[263] The FLN reiterated their uncompromising stance when,on August 28th 1961,they issued a communique pledging to continue their military struggle against France.[264]

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[261] Horne,pp.394-96;and Behr,p.175.

[262] C.H.Favrod,'The Swiss and Secret Negotiations,' in Rioux(ed),pp.405-6;Horne,pp.466-8;and Talbott, pp.220-2.

[263] Horne,pp.470-1;O'Ballance,pp.191-2;Talbott,pp.223-4; and Behr,p.186.

[264] Horne,p.479.

FLN intransigence over settler and oil rights paid off.On September 5th 1961,De Gaulle dropped France's claim to the Sahara and in a radio broadcast on October 2nd he conceded Algerian independence.[265] A few months later on 18th February 1962 he dropped his insistence on settler rights.[266]

The Evian Treaty signed on March 18th 1962 involved substantial French concessions.Algeria gained her independence and retained her control of the Sahara Desert and the oil resources contained within.There was a gradual withdrawal of French troops over a period of twelve months.French settlers were given the choice of Algerian citizenship or foreign national status.[267] The agreement, which involved the humbling of a major European power,seems to vindicate Pillar's view on the efficacy of hardline approaches in peace bargaining.The FLN's tough bargaining worked because the French had already decided the leave the colony.

Analysis of the Portuguese war in Mozambique also supports the ideas of Randle and Pillar regarding commonality of bargaining aims and diplomatic tactics.The convergence of Frelimo and Portuguese objectives is seen in the opening peace proposals.It is probable that the worsening politico-military conditions inside Mozambique forced Spinola and his supporters such as

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[265] Talbott,pp.224,227-8.

[266] ibid,p.228;and Horne,pp.511-15.

[267] Horne,pp.520-21;and Talbott,pp.229-31.

General Costa Gomes to press for an immediate ceasefire followed by a referendum on self determination.This new offer was made during the first round of the Lusaka talks which ended on 9th June.[268] On the other hand,Samora Machel wanted Portugal to recognise the Mozambicans' inalienable right to independence,transfer power to the Mozambican people and recognise Frelimo as the Mozambicans' sole representative.[269] Clearly,both sides wanted peace and Portugal's proposals indicate the growing recognition in Lisbon that independence was imminent.After all,if a referendum was held on self determination in Mozambique a vote for independence was a likely result.In short a commonality of interests existed from the outset of the talks.

The Mozambican War also supports Pillar's view that the adoption of a hardline approach by one of the belligerents can lead to peace.Frelimo consistently stuck to its demand for independence.For example,Machel rejected the proposed referendum and renewed his insistence on independence on the 13th June.[270] A month later Portugal bowed to Frelimo's demands and accepted independence.A peace agreement was signed between the belligerents on September 8th 1974.

We now have to consider why hardline tactics worked in the negotiations to end the war in Mozambique.The key

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[268] The Times,10th June 1974.

[269] The Times,5th September 1974.

[270] The Times,14th June 1974.

reason for Frelimo's successful hardline approach was that Portugal's position significantly worsened in the last months of the war,with Mozambique tottering on the brink of anarchy.Soldiers deserted at Boane and elsewhere. Others refused to fight.There was widespread fraternisation between Frelimo and Portuguese troops in Tete,Manica and Sofala.In towns and cities there were strikes and demonstrations.Frelimo's attacks edged closer to Lorenco Marques,hitherto untouched by the war.The Beira-Malawi train route was continually attacked.An analogy from the game of poker is pertinent here.Portugal had been dealt a weak hand at the Lusaka peace talks.She could not out-bid Frelimo because the guerrilla movement had all the high cards.Bluffing was out of the question.Portugal's military position was obviously collapsing in the closing stages of the war.

There is some evidence that Frelimo used military coercion to secure a peace agreement.From August through to September 1974 Frelimo increased its attacks on Portuguese positions.The key railway link from Beira to Rhodesia was constantly sabotaged. Frelimo attacks edged closer to Lourenco Marques the capital of Mozambique.It is possible that Frelimo stepped up its campaign in the last months of the war in order to achieve concessions from Portugal. However,without documentary evidence this assertion is difficult to prove.

The worsening situation in Mozambique provided the backdrop for the Portuguese acceptance of an independent

Mozambican state.[271] Once Portugal conceded independence the main barrier to a successful resolution had been removed.The peace agreement was signed on 8th September,and the date for independence was set for 25th June 1975.Frelimo was to take over an interim government,with six ministries controlled by Frelimo, and the Portuguese running the Health, Public Works and Transport Departments.Portuguese and Frelimo troops would patrol Mozambique's borders and the ceasefire would be controlled by a joint military commission. Finally Frelimo agreed to accept financial obligations left over from the colonial era,namely the funding of the Cabora Bassa Hydro-electric power project in the Tete district.[272] The Portuguese capitulation clearly supports Pillar's view that hardline approaches to bargaining do in fact frequently produce peace.The hardline approach adopted by Frelimo worked because Portugal was anxious to withdraw from Mozambique regardless of the political cost.

Timasheff:Durable Peace Settlements

Nicholas Timasheff argued that a durable peace treaty required all belligerents to be more or less satisfied with the settlement.Dissatisfaction,he suggested,would lead to resentment and possibly another war.[273]

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[271] The Times,17th August 1974.

[272] The Times,9th and 21st September 1974.

[273] Timasheff,p.233.

We saw earlier that the Baling peace talks failed to end the Emergency in Malaya.The war was to last another five years,until,in 1960,Chin Peng and four hundred supporters fled over the border into the Thai jungles.There was no formal peace settlement-no treaty,no accords-just a gradual winding down of a long war.Since no agreement was signed Timasheff's idea does not seem relevant.

However,Timasheff's idea about long lasting peace settlements does apply to the Indo-China case study.We saw earlier that the Geneva Accords on Indo-China had a military aspect and a political dimension. The first was honoured whilst the second was not.France implemented the military provisions, declared a ceasefire and began slowly withdrawing its troops from its ex-colony.Communist prisoners were also released.The French were content with this outcome.France had extricated itself from a long and brutal war and the Vietminh were also content that colonial occupation had ceased.There is no evidence that either the French or the Vietminh resented this state of affairs.

Unfortunately,the political aspect of the Geneva Accords did cause considerable resentment,and arguably it was this anger which undermined the treaty.The Vietminh resented the division of Vietnam into North and South.It also seems that the South Vietnamese resented having to call a referendum on unification because of the likelihood that Ho Chi Minh would win.The Vietminh's anger at the division of Vietnam was reinforced by the South's refusal to carry out the referendum.As a result the Vietminh

stepped up its activities in the south,undermining the Diem Govenment.This state of affairs led Stanley Karnow to observe that the Accords were merely a temporary truce in a long and bloody war.Thus,Timsaheff's thesis seems to hold.Resentment clearly undermined the Geneva peace settlements and led to further bloodshed.

Timasheff's ideas about the durability of peace settlements also seems to be applicable to the Franco-Algerian war.The Evian Agreements ended the Algerian war.De Gaulle and the FLN successfully negotiated an end to an eight year war which had cost the lives of 15000 French troops and about 140,000 Algerians.The end of France's costly colonial commitment meant that De Gaulle could concentrate on his aim of modernising and restoring the grandeur of France.The FLN achieved its goal of independence and installed itself as the government of the new state.The Evian Accords did cause some resentment,but fortunately not enough to undermine the treaty.For example,many French settlers in Algeria were angry with the settlement,and thousands voted with their feet and left the new state.Out of a pre war French population of one million about 150,000 remained at war's end.[274] Later on,in the 1990s,Algeria suffered political problems resulting from religious and tribal divisions,but none of these was caused by resentment about the Evian Accords and the treaty was not undermined by subsequent political problems.

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[274] Maurice Larkin,France Since the Popular Front, (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1988.Reprinted 1990 and 1991),p.278.

Finally,Timasheff's idea about durable peace also seems to stand up in the Mozambican case study.Portugal and Frelimo were both satisfied with the outcome.The subsequent civil war which ended in 1994 was largely unrelated to the peace settlement.The civil war between Frelimo and Renamo was based on tribal and ideological lines.It seems probable that the war of independence was sufficient to unite the many different tribes under a common cause-to rid Mozambique of Portugal.Once this aim was achieved in 1975, the raison d'etre of the Frelimo coalition fell apart and civil war began shortly afterwards.

Summary

Randle and Pillar's ideas about common interests and peace making can be applied to all of the case studies.In Malaya neither Britain nor the MCP shared common interests and as a result the war continued.In Indo-China the French and Vietminh's desire for a ceasefire ensured the success of the Geneva talks.In Algeria the desire for a ceasefire brought the belligerents to the bargaining table.Portugal's desire for a cessation of hostilities whatever the cost was an opportunity too good to miss for Frelimo.

Pillar's ideas about bargaining tactics seem applicable to three of the case studies.In Malaya we have no evidence that Britain or MCP used any of the tactics outlined by Pillar.The one month deadline and threat of military escalation helped secure the agreement which

terminated the French war in Indo-China.The hardline,no concession,approach used by the FLN ended the Algerian war and secured,for the FLN at least,a highly advantageous agreement with all their core aims realised.Likewise in Mozambique the tough line adopted by Frelimo ensured the termination of the war with all of Frelimo's core aims achieved.

It seems that the tactics outlined by Pillar are effective if any of the following three conditions are present.First,external pressure;second,a deteriorating military position for one of the belligerents;third, a political desire to terminate the war whatever the cost.

Timasheff's ideas about durable peace settlements are also supported by three of the case studies.In Malaya his thesis does not apply because neither Britain or the MCP signed an agreement to end the war.With regard to Indo-China his idea seems applicable to the post war situation.Ho Chi Minh was unhappy at the division of Vietnam below the 17th parallel and Diem's government in South Vietnam refused to hold a referendum on unification.As a result the treaty was undermined and war resumed in the late 1950s.

In Algeria the Evian Accords were durable.Both belligerents were satisfied with the outcome.The Lusaka Accords which terminated the war in Mozambique have also proved to be durable.Although a civil war began soon after the war ended it had nothing do with resentment with the Lusaka agreement and everything to do with tribal and

ideological splits within the newly independent state.

Durable peace occurs when the core aims of the victor are realised and when the loser achieves at least a face saving resolution of the war.Unrealised war aims and the failure by one side to carry out the provisions of a peace agreement will undermine the peace treaty and possibly lead to further conflict.

Chapter Ten

Conclusions,Policy Implications and Further Research

Theories of Victory

The table below displays the results of the application of O'Connor's theories of victory.First, O'Connor argued that a victory is an outcome satisfactory to at least one of the belligerents and includes the attainment of independence.Second,O'Connor argued that the side which wins the hearts and minds of a people will win a colonial war.

	First Idea Satisfactory Outcome	Second Idea Hearts and Minds
Malaya	Applicable British Victory Malayan Independence	Applicable Observables indicate the failure of MCP to win hearts and minds.
Indochina	Not wholly applicable. Partial Victory for both sides.Vietminh very dissatisfied.	Not wholly applicable. Vietminh success in Tonkin;French success in Cochinchina.
Algeria	Not wholly applicable French Containment of FLN. Algerian Independence	Not wholly applicable. FLN success in Aures and Kabylia,but weak in towns.
Mozambique	Applicable Mozambican Independence	Applicable Observables indicate Frelimo success.

O'Connor's victory ideas as applied to the four case studies

O'Connor correctly pointed out that the side which manages to win the hearts and minds usually wins the insurgency.The Vietminh,FLN and Frelimo seem to have been better at this than their colonial opponents.Despite conventional force inferiority,the liberation movements

managed to hold out,refusing to admit defeat.For example in Mozambique,a Portuguese army command report of September 1973 estimated that it would take at least another fifteen years to defeat Frelimo.[275]

Colonial warfare poses a cruel dilemma for an imperial power because in order to win it has to grant major political concessions and yet failure to reform will result in defeat.Events in Indo-China,Algeria and Mozambique show this to be the case.

Berenice's Carrol's Concept of 'Victory.'

Berenice Carroll defined 'victory' as the creation of a victor and vanquished relationship between two belligerents.[276] Her idea is relevant to Malaya and Mozambique, but not to the Algerian and Indo-Chinese wars.Carroll's thesis cannot be applied to Indo-China because it is difficult to establish who the victor and vanquished were at war's end.In Algeria,we found that France won in the military sense of the term but still had to concede independence.

A weakness of Carroll's idea is that it regards 'victory' as a "zero-sum" game:one victor,one vanquished, just like a game of tennis.Victory is not like this.Her idea does not take account of the possibility of the partial attainment of military and political aims.It is possible to have two partial victors in a war.We saw this

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[275] Henriksen,Revolution and Counterrevolution,p.56.

[276] Carroll,'How Wars End...',pp.305-306.

in the Indochina case study where both the Vietminh and France could claim a partial victory.

Her thesis needs to be modified by making a distinction between military and political victory.If applied to the Algerian war,we can see the following result.France won the war in the military sense,but the FLN was the political victor because Algeria gained independence,with the FLN being the sole party of government in the new state.

Termination Points

Lewis Coser suggested that the capture of major strategic asset indicated the ending of a war.Galtung and Kecskemeti noted that irreversible qualitative shifts on the battlefield were imminent signs of a war's end. Klingberg and Voevodsky maintained that high casualties and successive defeats were signs that a war would soon end.The following table summarises the results of our application of their theories to the historical reality of colonial warfare.

Wars End	Coser	Galtung and Kecskemeti	Klingberg and Voevodsky
Malaya 1960	N\A	Yes-1951	Yes.1957-60
Indochina 1954	Yes-1953	Yes-1953	Yes.Dec 1952-June 1953
Algeria 1962	N\A	Yes-1959	Yes-1957-59
Mozambique 1974	N\A	Yes-1972/73	Yes-1972-74

Termination Points when applied to the Four Case Studies

In Algeria,Indochina,and Mozambique,the termination point that seems to have tipped the balance was the realisation by the colonial power that the war was militarily unwinnable.In the Indochina War this occurred in 1952-1953,in Algeria in 1959,and in Mozambique from 1972-1973.In each of these three cases the realisation occurred after a major effort had resulted in military failure.

Termination points in colonial wars are characterised by the existence of time lags between 'termination point crossed' and 'actual war termination.'These time lags varied from war to war.In Malaya there was a nine-year lag;in Indo-China a two-year lag;in Algeria a three-year time lag;and in Mozambique a two-year lag.Time lags exist because of the nature of colonial warfare,with its emphasis on winning people over to a particular cause,and its method of conducting the actual fighting-fortifying villages, manning checkpoints, conducting ambushes and skirmishes.But the time lag does not affect the validity of the argument.

Public Opinion and De-Escalation

Edward Azar suggested that rising public dissatisfaction with a war will lead to military de-escalation and the normalisation of political relations.

Azar's idea cannot be applied to the Malayan Emergency.Britain de-escalated in the period from 1957-60 because the MCP was driven out of all Malayan states except Johore and Perak.A successful COIN campaign allowed the de-

escalation.We therefore have the interesting example of a case of a victor choosing to de-escalate a war,whereas Azar suggests that the onus to de-escalate a war usually rests with the losing side.

It seems clear that public opinion will not necessarily force policy makers to de-escalate a war.For example,in both Algeria and Indo-China,France maintained a high troop presence up to and after peace agreements were signed.The French wanted to secure an honourable withdrawal from Indochina and a robust military presence was vital if this aim was to be achieved.The Cold War prevented France and the North Vietnam from normalising relations.In Algeria France maintained a high troop presence to curtail OAS and FLN terrorism from 1960-62.In this case a large troop presence was needed to maintain civil order.Despite the absence of military de-escalation,France and Algeria normalised relations at war's end.

Unlike the Malayan,Indo-Chinese and Algerian case studies,the de-escalation process in Mozambique seems to support Azar's ideas.The fraternisation between Frelimo and Portuguese troops in the last six months of the war indicates a move away from hatred and distrust to a normalisation of relations.Portugal had re-ranked her aims with war termination being the main priority.

Domestic Factors Delaying War Termination

Five domestic factors delay war termination.First, interest groups can block war termination. Soldiers and

settlers blocked war termination in Algeria.Second,there is the economic justification for retaining colonial empires. Algeria contained large natural gas deposits.Mozambique was an important southern African trade hub,its ports and railways processing goods from South Africa,Rhodesia,Zambia and Malawi.Third,a state can continue fighting a war if it receives outside aid.Both the French and Portuguese were greatly aided by foreign military help.By 1953-54,the Americans were paying for more than half of France's military expenditure in the Indo-Chinese war. Fourth, ideological factors can block war termination. This was true in Indochina and in Mozambique where the colonial powers perceived a major communist threat to their colonial interests.The other ideological factor was the belief that empires conferred greatness on the colonisers concerned. Losing colonies meant a loss of prestige and influence in international affairs.

This last point is an important one because it ties in with a fifth factor which delayed war termination,namely the Portuguese and French theories of Empire.France and Portugal regarded their colonies as part of la patrie or the motherland.Even in 1998,overseas France still exists-(Tahiti and the Comorro Islands for example,or Macau,which is still part of overseas Portugal.) The belief that colonies are intrinsically part of the motherland explains the reluctance of the colonial powers to let the colonies go.This paternalistic attitude hindered the French and Portuguese COIN campaigns.It meant they were reluctant to

grant autonomy to the colonies and sponsor alternative national parties.

These feelings and attitudes helped block numerous attempts to open peace talks.In Indo-China settlers thwarted calls for peace by Mendes France in 1950.During the Franco-Algerian War,Pierre Poujade and his military and civilian supporters and sypathisers resisted two peace attempts in 1956 and 1958.

Re-Orientation

It is possible to refer to a 'domestic origin of peace' in the Mozambican War of Independence,and the two French wars in Algeria and Indo-China.Once the politicians involved realised the wars were unwinnable they decided to withdraw. Although the military position in Algeria was a stalemate,the prospect of huge overseas defence costs for years to come,coupled with fighting an enemy content just to survive,were probably the main factors that tipped the balance in favour of war termination.In Algeria,Indo-China and Mozambique,regime change was vital for the peace process.It seems that wars can be terminated only when those associated with failed war policies are removed from office.

Domestic factors play a decisive role in war termination in lengthy unconventional wars where the military results are unclear.They are also important when states are defending secondary values.If it is a colony or a far away ally which is under attack,rather than the

mother country,and if there are no tangible gains at stake,then the public may question the wisdom of defending 'secondary' values.Portugal's war in Mozambique is a good illustration of this point.Other examples of this occurring include the Franco-Indo-Chinese War and the Franco-Algerian War of 1954-1962.

Conversely,if a group is defending its core or primary values in a war,then only military defeat will lead to war termination.Domestic factors seem to be less important for insurgent movements whose primary concern is independence from a colonial power.If one compares colonial warfare to a test of wills,those fighting for their core values are clearly less likely to succumb to domestic pressures for termination than those fighting to defend secondary values.

Ceasefires and Peacemaking

The table on the following page displays the results of our application of the theories of Randle,Pillar and Timasheff to the four case studies.

	Common Aims?	Pillar's tactics	Timasheff's Results
Malaya	No	No evidence	Abortive
Indochina	Yes:Both sides	Timetable plus threat of escalation	Ceasefire
Algeria	Yes-both sides	FLN policy of no concessions	Political Settlement
Mozambique	Yes-Portugal	Frelimo pursued policy of no concessions	Political Settlement

Application of the ideas of Randle,Pillar and Timasheff to the four case studies

It is perhaps not surprising that the Baling peace talks in Malaya were abortive.We saw earlier that neither Britain nor the MCP revalued their priorities.Britain and the MCP had fundamental differences at Baling.As a result, Pillar's bargaining tactics do not seem to apply in the Malayan case.Following on from this,Timasheff's theory does not apply either.There was no political or military settlement and hence nothing to resent or be pleased about.

When we come to the case of Indo-China we see that Timasheff's views seem at first to cast some doubt on Randle's and Pillar's ideas.Both sides wanted a ceasefire.We also saw that Mendes-Framce threatened to escalate the war and imposed a month deadline.In theory,peace ought to have been durable-the political pre-conditions existed and an imaginative combination of bargaining tools were used to secure an agreement.Yet peace in the ex-French colony was short-lived.This situation occurred because neither Ho Chi Minh nor Ngo Dinh Diem-the

leaders of North and South Vietnam respectively-were prepared to abide by the agreement.Both were influenced by wider political and ideological considerations.Ho wanted to unite Vietnam and form a unified Communist republic and was quite prepared to use war as an instrument of state policy to achieve this aim.Diem (and his American sponsors) were anxious to preserve the capitalist status quo in South Vietnam.With both North and South on a virtual collision course,war became more rather than less likely in the late 1950s.

The Mozambique and Algerian cases clearly suggest that,in certain circumstances,hardline bargaining tactics work.It seems that these tactics work when one of the belligerents is anxious to disengage from the war,regardless of political cost and wounded pride.This state of affairs occurred in Mozambique because of a deteriorating military situation.It occurred in Algeria because De Gaulle wanted to concentrate on rebuilding the grandeur of France,rather than shoring up a colonial anachronism.

Conclusion

So far we have tested the applicability of war termination theories against four case studies.At this point is may be useful to go further than this by identifying some policymaking implications which will enable soldiers and statesmen to appreciate at what stage of a war termination process they have reached.

First,however,it is necessary to devise a system or framework whoch would enable them to judge how well or badly a campaign is going,and we need to identify those indicators which suggest that wars are about to end.

The system or framework could perhaps be based upon observable behaviour such as the scale of the military violence measured by the size of rebel forces attacking colonial positions,and the pattern of military violence-i.e is it spreading or confined to a certain area? Both these things can be measured by the number of attacks in a certain area,and the size of the attacking forces.These calculations will help a belligerent to judge how well or how badly a campaign is going.

The indicators which point to the ending of a war are of two types.The first is military whilst the second is political.Military indicators include the following.First, loss of control of vital strategic assets such as walled villages.Second,evidence that the war is spreading to other parts of the country.Third,signs that rebel forces are increasingly moving around in broad daylight and in strength.Fourth,the capture of senior rebel commanders and large caches of weapons.

Political indicators might include the following.First, willingness on the part of one of the belligerents to offer peace talks.For example,the Vietminh in late 1953 made it known that they were interested in starting peace talks with the French.Second,growing public opinion in favour of terminating a war.This is easily

measured by the use of opinion surveys.

It is clear that war termination occurs when the will to stop a war becomes greater than will to continue fighting.The will to stop fighting occurs either when military aims have been attained,or when one side has been defeated on the battlefield,or when the cost of continuing the war becomes prohibitively high.In the case of prohibitive costs,the pressure to stop fighting arises from economic pressures,military sections of a bureaucracy,or from politicians,or international pressure from other states,or a combination of these four forces.

Further Research

Further research on war termination will need to test the validity of the hypothesis outlined in this Conclusion. Another line of research would be the testing of the following ideas.First,colonial powers will not win a colonial war in the mid to late twentieth century unless they first realise that winning the hearts and minds of a population requires them to grant eventual independence. Victory is this sense does not mean retention of a colony.It means denying one nationlist party the right to govern and transferring that right to another,possibly less extreme party.The British experience in Malaya provides a good illustration of a successful 'Victory by denial' strategy. The British decision to grant independence,so early in the Emergency greatly helped the COIN programmes and robbed the MCP of its claim that it alone could offer

independence.Instead,the United Malayan Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) took power in the newly independent state,where it still rules.Cultural,economic,military,legal and political ties between Britain and Malaysia are strong. Compared to other states in South East Asia,Malaysia's democratic institutions are relatively robust and stable,and its people are prosperous,despite the financial turmoil of 1997 and 1998.

Second,it would be interesting to test the following hypothesis: nationalism as an idea cannot be defeated by a colonial power.Even if an insurgency is defeated militarily, nationalist ideas will remain imprinted on the hearts of the survivors.Sooner or later they will prevail.

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